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1 Introduction
The transportation of hazardous materials (or dangerous goods) deserves
to be treated in a separate chapter of this volume, primarily due to the risks as-
sociated with this activity. Although the industry has an excellent safety record,
accidents do happen, and the consequences can be significant, due to the na-
ture of the cargo. Reduction of hazardous material (hazmat) transportation
risks can be achieved in many different ways. Some of these risk reduction
measures, such as driver training and regular vehicle maintenance, have little
connection to operations research (OR), whereas others offer interesting chal-
lenges to OR. This chapter focuses on applications of OR models to hazmat
transportation, providing a relatively comprehensive review of the literature,
and outlining areas of potential impact for operations researchers.
According to the US Department of Transportation (US DOT), a hazardous
material is defined as any substance or material capable of causing harm to
people, property, and the environment. Dependence on hazardous materials
is a fact of life in industrialized societies. There are thousands of different haz-
ardous materials in use today (US DOT, 2004b). The United Nations sorts
hazardous materials into nine classes according to their physical, chemical, and
nuclear properties: explosives and pyrotechnics; gasses; flammable and com-
bustible liquids; flammable, combustible, and dangerous-when-wet solids; ox-
idizers and organic peroxides; poisonous and infectious materials; radioactive
materials; corrosive materials (acidic or basic); and miscellaneous dangerous
goods, such as hazardous wastes (UN, 2001). In almost all instances, hazmats
originate at a location other than their destination. For example, oil is extracted
from oil fields and shipped to a refinery (typically via a pipeline); many oil
products, such as heating oil and gasoline, are refined at the refinery and then
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shipped to storage tanks at different locations within a country. As another
example, polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) are collected at many industrial
installations, such as old power generation and transfer stations and shipped
to a special waste management facility for safe disposal (usually incineration).
Hence, transportation plays a significant role for hazmats. The magnitude of
this role depends on the size of a country and its level of industrialization.
For example, the Office of Hazardous Materials Safety (OHMS) of the US
DOT estimated that there were 800,000 domestic shipments of hazmats, to-
taling approximately 9 million tons, in the USA each day in 1998 (US DOT,
2000). Transport Canada estimates that nearly 80,000 shipments of dangerous
goods are moved by road, rail, water, and air in Canada (Transport Canada,
2004). Given a conservative estimate of 2% annual growth in the production
of hazmats, it is safe to assume that the total number of shipments in North
America is well over the one million mark in 2005.
In 2002, over 99 percent of hazmat shipments in Canada made it safely to
their destination (Transport Canada, 2004). While the hazmat transport sector
is far safer than other transport sectors (US DOT, 2000), hazmat transport
accidents do happen. Figure 1 shows the distribution of accidents/incidents
by hazmat class in 2003. An accident resulting in a release of the hazmat is
called an incident. The figure shows that flammable–combustible liquids and
corrosive materials accounted for the majority of hazmat accidents/incidents
in the USA (US DOT, 2004a).
The transportation of hazmats can be classified according to the mode of
transport, namely: road, rail, water, air, and pipeline. Some shipments are in-
termodal; they are switched from one mode to another during transit. There
Fig. 1. Accident/incident by hazmat class in 2003 (US DOT, 2004a).
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are significant differences in the use of these modes. While transportation by
truck accounts for approximately 94% of all individual hazmat shipments in the
USA, this mode carries merely 43% of the hazmat tonnage since the volume
that can be shipped by one truck is limited compared to other modes of trans-
port. In contrast, rail, water, and pipelines carry 57% of the hazmat tonnage
while accounting for less than 1% of all individual shipments. It is possible
to carry huge quantities of hazmats using these modes. While the counting
of individual shipments is less clear with these modes (How do we count the
number of shipments via a pipeline? Does a train consisting of multiple hazmat
tank cars count as a single shipment?), they carry much larger quantities per
shipment than trucks do. The balance of hazmat shipments (5% by count and
0.05% by weight) are made via air (US DOT, 1998).
Hazmat transport incidents can occur at the origin or destination (when
loading and unloading) or en-route. Incidents involving hazmat cargo can lead
to severe consequences characterized by fatalities, injuries, evacuation, prop-
erty damage, environmental degradation, and traffic disruption. In 2003, there
were 488 serious incidents (among a total of 15,178 incidents) resulting in
15 deaths, 17 major and 18 minor injuries, and a total property damage of
$37.75 million (US DOT, 2004c). About 90% of hazmat incidents occur on
highways. As far as causes go, human error seems to be the single greatest
factor (see Figure 2) in all hazardous materials incidents (minor and serious
incidents).
The annual number of nonhazmat transportation accidents in the USA is
estimated to be 126,880, in contrast to the approximately 15,000 hazmat trans-
Fig. 2. Serious incident by mode/cause in 2003 (US DOT, 2004c).
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portation accidents and incidents (FMCSA, 2001). Even though hazmats are
involved in a small minority of all transport accidents, hazmat accidents can
have catastrophic consequences. In 2003, for example, 22 train cars derailed at
Tamoroa, IL, resulting in the release of various types and quantities of haz-
ardous materials from seven tank cars. The evacuation of over a thousand
residents within a three-mile radius and the closing of Highway 51 followed
the derailment.
Table 1 contrasts the average costs (per event) of hazmat and nonhazmat
motor carrier accidents and incidents for one year. Although the cost of an
average hazmat incident is not significantly higher than the cost of a non-
hazmat incident, the cost of a hazmat incident resulting in fire or explosion
is significantly higher. Hazmat transportation accidents are perceived as low
probability–high consequence (LPHC) events and data seem to support this
perception. For example, chlorine leaking from damaged tank cars due to a de-
railment in Mississauga, Ontario in 1979, forced the evacuation of 200,000 peo-
ple. In 1982, a gasoline truck explosion in a tunnel in Afghanistan caused 2700
fatalities. Most transport accidents that impact a large number of people and
result in significant economic loss involve a hazmat cargo.
Hazmat transportation involves multiple players such as shippers, carri-
ers, packaging manufacturers, freight forwarders, consignees, insurers, govern-
ments, and emergency responders; each has a different role in safely moving
hazardous materials from their origins to their destinations. There are often
multiple handoffs of material from one party to another during transport. The
various parties, ranging from individuals or small firms to large multinational
organizations, may have overlapping and unclear responsibilities for managing
the risks (ICF Consulting, 2000). Furthermore, each party may have differ-
ent priorities and viewpoints. Although the transportation department or local
government is responsible for designating allowable routes that reduce risk,
a carrier company would, in general, try to identify the route that minimizes
the fuel costs and travel times, between the origin and destination for each
shipment. Some routes have short lengths but move through heavily populated
areas; some routes avoid heavily populated areas but are longer, resulting in
higher transport costs and accident probabilities; while other routes use major
Table 1.
Comparative costs of hazmat and nonhazmat motor carrier accident/incident events (FMCSA, 2001)




Nonhazmat events 340000 2
All hazmat events 414000 –
Hazmat events with spill/release 536000 5
Hazmat events with fire 1200000 8
Hazmat events with explosion 2100000 12
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freeways and thus minimize travel time but may be associated with higher ac-
cident rates. Thus, hazmat transportation is a typical multiobjective problem
with multiple stakeholders.
Multiobjective/multistakeholder problems are complicated to solve. Haz-
mat transport problems are further complicated by public sensitivity surround-
ing these problems. The concept of social amplification of risk (see Kasperson
et al., 1988; Renn et al., 1992) indicates that public assessment of a risk de-
pends not only on its magnitude but also on subjective perceptions. The in-
dividual and social perceptions of risk can be heightened or attenuated by
many factors such as extensive media coverage of the hazard event (see, e.g.,
Horlick-Jones, 1995), involvement of social groups (see, e.g., Moore, 1989),
inaccuracies and inconsistencies in the communication process that lead to ru-
mors and speculations on risk magnitude (see, e.g., Mileti and O’Brien, 1992;
Barnes, 2001). The amplification of the risk of a relatively minor hazmat acci-
dent may imply much stronger public reaction and results in a call for action,
such as tighter transport regulations or even the banning of hazmat shipments
via a certain mode of transport, in some extreme cases.
Public sensitivity to hazmat transport is rooted not only in public risk per-
ceptions, but also in equity concerns. Those individuals benefiting from hazmat
shipments are usually those who live near the production facility or the delivery
points. Yet the population living along a major highway connecting the hazmat
origin and destinations is exposed to the transport risks regardless of whether
or not they benefit from the hazmat shipments. This lack of burden-benefit
concordance is another source of public opposition to hazmat shipments. The
shipment of spent nuclear fuel rods from nuclear power plants to the proposed
repository at Yucca Mountain in Nevada, USA, offers a good example of eq-
uity-based public opposition. The shipping reduces the risk at the power plants.
Yet some risk is imposed on the population living along the major east–west
highways or railways, who are asked to assume the risk with no clear bene-
fits to them. Furthermore, if the same main route segment were selected for
shipments from multiple origins, the objection of people living along this route
would increase considerably. These people are likely to prefer alternate rout-
ings that would spread the risks.
Public opposition to hazmat shipments has increased in recent years, due
to fears of terrorist attacks on hazmat vehicles. The Research and Special
Projects Administration (RSPA) of US DOT accepts that hazmats could pose
a significant threat during transportation, when they are particularly vulner-
able to sabotage or misuse as weapons of mass destruction or as weapons of
convenience by terrorists – particularly given how easy it is to identify a haz-
mat vehicle (as well as the specifics of their cargo) given the current system of
hazmat placards. As a result some jurisdictions are trying to force a rerouting
of hazmat vehicles away from populated areas by implementing local laws.
Much of the discussion to this point also applies to the location of hazardous
facilities. If anything, the risks and the public opposition are higher for fixed
facilities than for transport. Operations researchers have dealt with both types
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of problems, and we will include references to facility location as well as trans-
portation problems in this chapter, particularly for facility location models that
treat the transportation component explicitly.
The rest of this chapter is organized in the following way. In Section 2, we of-
fer a high-level view of hazmat logistics literature where we summarize special
journal issues, reference books, reports, and web sites that are potentially use-
ful to an operations researcher who wishes to conduct research in this area. We
also offer a classification of journal papers, which provides the organizational
structure for the rest of the chapter. Section 3 contains a treatment of risk, the
main ingredient of hazmat logistics problems that separate them from other
logistics problems. We review different models of risk for hazmat transport
and discuss how one can go from point risk to edge risk and then to route risk.
Section 4 deals with hazmat routing and scheduling problems. In Section 5,
we turn our attention to models that combine undesirable facility location and
hazmat transportation. In the final section we offer a critique of the existing
literature and suggest directions for future research.
2 A high-level view of hazmat logistics research
2.1 Special issues of journals
Hazmat logistics has been a very active research area during the last twenty
years. In 1984 Management Science published a special issue on Risk Analysis
(Vol. 30, No. 4) where five papers dealt with hazmats and hazardous facilities.
This was followed by a number of special issues of refereed academic journals
that focus on hazmat transportation or location problems.
• Transportation Research Record published two special issues on hazmat
transportation in 1988 (No. 1193) that included four papers and 1989
(No. 1245) that included six papers.
• Transportation Science devoted an issue to hazmat logistics in 1991
(Vol. 25, No. 2) that contained six papers.
• There was a special section on hazmat transportation in the March/
April 1993 issue of the Journal of Transportation Engineering that in-
cluded four papers.
• A special double-issue of INFOR on hazardous materials logistics was
published in 1995 (Vol. 33, No. 1 and 2) with nine papers.
• Four papers were included in a special issue of Location Science dealing
with hazmats in 1995 (Vol. 3, No. 3).
• Transportation Science produced a second special issue on hazmat lo-
gistics in 1997 (Vol. 31, No. 3) with seven papers.
• Studies in Locational Analysis published a special issue on undesirable
facility location in April 1999 (Issue 12) that contained seven papers.
Ch. 9. Hazardous Materials Transportation 545
• Computers & Operations Research will publish a hazmat logistics special
issue in 2007 which will contain results of the most recent research in
the area in 13 papers.
These special issues contain many useful papers and they offer a good start-
ing point for research in this area. Likewise, the book chapter by Erkut and
Verter (1995a) offers a relatively comprehensive survey of the literature up to
1994, and the annotated bibliography by Verter and Erkut (1995) offers a good
list of pre-1994 references in risk assessment, location, and routing.
2.2 Books
Perhaps an even better starting point for those who wish to familiarize them-
selves with the terminology and the problem context are the following books.
• Transportation of Hazardous Materials: Issues in Law, Social Science,
and Engineering (1993), edited by L.N. Moses and D. Lindstrom,
Kluwer Academic Publishers. This book contains 18 articles presented
at Hazmat Transport ‘91, a national conference held at Northwestern
University on all aspects of hazmat transport. While only a few of
the articles use OR models and techniques, the book offers a multi-
dimensional treatment of the subject and it is good reading for new
researchers in the area.
• Three books were produced by Institute for Risk Research, University
of Waterloo, as a result of the First International Consensus Confer-
ence on the Risks of Transporting Dangerous Goods, held in Toronto,
Canada in April, 1992:
• Transportation of Dangerous Goods: Assessing the Risks (1993), edited
by F.F. Saccomanno and K. Cassidy. This book contains 30 articles
which are organized into five main chapters: Application of QRA
models to the transport of Dangerous Goods; Analysis of Dangerous
Goods Accident and Releases; Application of Simple Risk Assess-
ment Methodology; Uncertainty in Risk Estimation; Risk Tolerance,
Communication and Policy Implications.
• Comparative Assessment of Risk Model Estimates for the Transport
of Dangerous Goods by Road and Rail (1993), edited by F.F. Sac-
comanno, D. Leming, and A. Stewart. This book documents the
assessment of a corridor exercise involving the application of sev-
eral risk models to a common transport problem involving the bulk
shipment of chlorine, LPG, and gasoline by road and rail along pre-
defined routes. The purpose of the corridor exercise was to provide
a well-defined transportation problem for analysis in order to exam-
ine the sources of variability in the risk estimates. Seven agencies in
six countries participated in this exercise.
• What is the Risk (1993), edited by F.F. Saccomanno, D. Leming, and
A. Stewart. This book documents the small group discussions and
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consensus testing process from the corridor exercise conducted as
part of the international consensus conference.
• Hazardous Materials Transportation Risk Analysis: Quantitative Ap-
proaches for Truck and Train (1994), Rhyne WR, Van Norstrand Rein-
hold. This book explains the quantitative risk analysis (QRA) method-
ologies and their application to hazmat transportation. It also provides
an extended example of a QRA for bulk transport of chlorine by truck
and train. This detailed example explores every step of the QRA from
preliminary hazards analysis to risk reduction alternatives. This book is
a valuable reference for hazmat transportation risks, and it is intended
for practitioners. It is not an OR book, but it provides useful informa-
tion for OR research in hazmat transportation modeling and analysis.
• Guidelines for Chemical Transportation Risk Analysis (1995), American
Institute of Chemical Engineers, Center for Chemical Process Safety
(CCPS), New York. This book completes two other books in the se-
ries of process safety guidelines books produced by CCPS: Guide-
lines for Chemical Process Quantitative Risk Analysis (CPQRA, 1989)
and Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures (HEP, 2nd edition,
1992). It is intended to be used as a companion volume to the CPQRA
and HEP Guidelines when dealing with a quantitative transportation
risk analysis (TRA) methodology. This book offers a basic approach to
TRA for different transport modes (pipelines, rail, road, barge, water,
and intermodal containers). It can be useful to an engineer or man-
ager in identifying cost effective ways to manage and reduce the risk of
a hazmat transportation operation.
• Quantitative Risk Assessment of Hazardous Materials Transport Systems
(1996), M. Nicolet-Monnier and A.V. Gheorge, Kluwer Academic Pub-
lishers. This book contains a comprehensive treatment of the analysis
and assessment of transport risks due to hazmat transport on roads,
rail, by ship, and pipeline. It contains European case studies as well
as a discussion of computer-based DSS (Decision Support System) for
hazmat transport problems. It is a useful reference book in the area.
2.3 Reports
In addition to these books, there are also a number of recent government
reports that contain a wealth of useful information for researchers in OR as
well as other relevant fields:
• AND-DIS-01-1 A National Risk Assessment for Selected Hazardous Ma-
terials in Transportation (2000), Argonne National Laboratory, Depart-
ment of Energy.
• ANL-DIS-00-1: Development of the Table of Initial Isolation and Pro-
tective Action Distances for the 2000 Emergency Response Guidebook
(2000), Argonne National Laboratory, Department of Energy.
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• Comparative Risks of Hazardous Materials and Non-Hazardous Materi-
als Truck Shipment Accidents/Incident (2001), Batelle.
• A Resource Handbook on DOE Transportation Risk Assessment (2002),
DOE Transportation Risk Assessment Working Group Technical Sub-
committee.
(Note: All URLs in this chapter were functional as of May 2005.)
2.4 Web sites
The following web sites contain useful information for practitioners as well
as researchers on hazmat transport:
• The Office of Hazardous Materials Safety (US DOT Research and
Special Programs Administration): http://hazmat.dot.gov/.
• The Hazmat 101 Web: http://www.hazmat101.com/.
• Hazmat Magazine: http://www.hazmatmag.com/.
• On-line hazmat school: http://www.hazmatschool.com/.
• National Hazardous Materials Route Registry: http://hazmat.fmcsa.dot.
gov/.
• United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) – Dan-
gerous Goods and Special Cargo: http://www.unece.org/trans/danger/
danger.htm.
• The Canadian Transport Emergency Centre (CANUTEC) of the De-
partment of Transport: http://www.tc.gc.ca/canutec/.
• A mailing list for those interested in hazmat transport: http://groups.
yahoo.com/group/DangerousGoods/.
2.5 Software
There exists some software which has been developed to aid the analysts
or decision makers in dealing with hazmat logistics. For example, ALOHA
(Areal Locations of Hazardous Atmospheres) predicts how a hazardous gas
cloud might disperse in the atmosphere after an accidental chemical release.
This software (see US EPA, 2004) has been developed jointly by the Na-
tional Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA) Hazardous Mate-
rials Response and Assessment Division and the US Environmental Protection
Agency’s (EPA) Chemical Emergency Preparedness and Prevention Office.
ALOHA can be useful for transport risk assessment. However, this software
is more useful for fixed facility risk assessment than for route selection.
In contrast to the availability of many software packages for regular truck
routing, we know of only one off-the-shelf hazmat routing package that is
currently available: PC*Miler|HazMat (ALK Associates, 1994). It has fea-
tures that allow transportation and logistics companies to determine routes
and mileages for hauling hazardous materials while ensuring compliance with
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government regulations. Routes can be generated for general, explosive, in-
halant and radioactive hazmats. This software contains all of the features and
functionality of PC*Miler, a routing, mileage and mapping software, which is
also developed by ALK. Here we note that HazTrans (Abkowitz et al., 1992)
and PC*HazRoute (ALK Associates, 1994) were marketed in the last decade,
but both are off the market as of 2005.
2.6 Classification
While we offer references to books, reports, and web sites in this section,
the rest of this chapter deals mainly with the academic literature consisting of
refereed journal articles. Figure 3 displays the number of papers published in
this area between 1982 and 2004. It seems that this area of research has peaked
in mid-1990s and has declined somewhat since.
Given the large number of papers in this area, we believe a simple classifi-
cation can be useful in providing some structure to the rest of the chapter. The
articles in this area deal with different aspects of the problem. One possible
classification is the following (in no particular order):
(1) risk assessment,
(2) routing,
(3) combined facility location and routing,
(4) network design.
Although we have offered this simple classification, it is fair to say that nu-
merous papers deal with problems that lie at the intersection of the above areas
and such problems are receiving increasingly more attention in the literature.
Fig. 3. Number of hazmat-transportation related papers published in refereed journals between 1982
and 2004.
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Tables 2(a–d) provides a classification of papers using the above four prob-
lem classes as well as other important attributes such as transport mode, par-
adigm (deterministic vs. stochastic) and number of objectives, and whether or
not the paper uses GIS (Geographic Information System) or proposes a DSS.
The rest of this chapter provides a comprehensive literature survey follow-
ing the problem classification presented above, and points out directions for
future research.
Table 2a.
A classification of hazmat transportation models – risk assesment
Road Jonkman et al., 2003; Nardini et al., 2003; Martinez-Alegria et al., 2003G;
Rosmuller and Van Gelder, 2003; Abkowitz, 2002C; Fabiano et al., 2002;
Kimberly and Killmer, 2002; Saccomanno and Haastrup, 2002N; Hollister,
2002; Hwang et al., 2001; Abkowitz et al., 2001; Verter and Kara, 2001G;
Efroymson and Murphy, 2000; ICF Consulting, 2000; Leonelli et al.,
2000; Zhang et al., 2000G; Pet-Armacost et al., 1999; Cassini, 1998; Mills
and Neuhauser, 1998; Cutter and Ji, 1997; Groothuis and Miller, 1997;
Lovett et al., 1997G; Pine and Marx, 1997; Alp and Zelensky, 1996;
Ertugrul, 1995; Sissell, 1995; Chakraborty and Armstrong, 1995; Erkut and
Verter, 1995aU; Erkut and Verter, 1995b; Moore et al., 1995G; Spadoni
et al., 1995; Verter and Erkut, 1995U; Gregory and Lichtenstein, 1994;
Macgregor et al., 1994; Hobeika and Kim, 1993; Sandquist et al., 1993;
Harwood et al., 1993; Abkowitz et al., 1992; Glickman, 1991; Grenney
et al., 1990DSS; Kunreuther and Easterling, 1990; Chow et al., 1990;
Abkowitz and Cheng, 1989; Ang and Briscoe, 1989; Harwood et al., 1989;
Abkowitz and Cheng, 1988; Hillsman, 1988; Horman, 1987; Keeney and
Winkler, 1985; Scanlon and Cantilli, 1985; Pijawka et al., 1985; Kunreuther
et al., 1984; Philipson et al., 1983; Wilmot, 1983; Keeney, 1980; Shappert
et al., 1973
Rail Anderson and Barkan, 2004; Barkan et al., 2003; Fronczak, 2001; Orr
et al., 2001; Dennis, 1996; Larson, 1996; Glickman and Golding, 1991;
McNeil and Oh, 1991; Saccomanno and Elhage, 1991; Glickman and
Rosenfield, 1984; Glickman, 1983; Saccomanno and El-Hage, 1989
Marine Douligeris et al., 1997; Roeleven et al., 1995; Romer et al., 1995
Air LaFrance-Linden et al., 2001
Road + rail Brown and Dunn, 2007; Milazzo et al., 2002; Bubbico et al., 2000; Neill
and Neill, 2000; Deng et al., 1996; Leeming and Saccomanno, 1994; Purdy,
1993; Saccomanno and Shortreed, 1993; Saccomanno and El-Hage, 1989;
Vanaerde et al., 1989; Glickman, 1988; Swoveland, 1987
Road + rail + marine Andersson, 1994
Road + rail + marine + air Kloeber et al., 1979
Cwith security consideration;
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Table 2b.
A classification of hazmat transportation models – routing
Local routing Road Akgün et al., 2007; Duque, 2007; Erkut and Ingolfsson, 2005;
Huang and Cheu, 2004CG; Huang et al., 2003CM; Kara et
al., 2003; Luedtke and White, 2002CU; Marianov et al., 2002;
Frank et al., 2000; Erkut and Ingolfsson, 2000; Leonelli et
al., 2000; Zografos et al., 2000DSS; Erkut and Verter, 1998;
Tayi et al., 1999M; Bonvicini et al., 1998; Marianov and ReV-
elle, 1998M; Verter and Erkut, 1997; Sherali et al., 1997M;
Nembhard and White, 1997M; Erkut and Glickman, 1997;
Jin and Batta, 1997; Verter and Erkut, 1997; Erkut, 1996;
Jin et al., 1996; Ashtakala and Eno, 1996S; Beroggi and Wal-
lace, 1995; Boffey and Karkazis, 1995; Erkut, 1995; Moore et
al., 1995G; Karkazis and Boffey, 1995; Glickman and Son-
tag, 1995M; McCord and Leu, 1995M; Sivakumar et al.,
1995; Beroggi, 1994; Beroggi and Wallace, 1994; Ferrada and
Michelhaugh, 1994; Patel and Horowitz, 1994G; Sivakumar
and Batta, 1994; Lassarre et al., 1993G; Sivakumar et al.,
1993; Turnquist, 1993MS; Wijeratne et al., 1993M; Lepofsky
et al., 1993G; Beroggi and Wallace, 1991; Miaou and Chin,
1991; Gopalan et al., 1990a; Chin, 1989M; Zografos and Davis,
1989M; Abkowitz and Cheng, 1988M; Batta and Chiu, 1988;
Vansteen, 1987; Cox and Turnquist, 1986; Belardo et al., 1985;
Saccomanno and Chan, 1985; Urbanek and Barber, 1980;
Kalelkar and Brinks, 1978M
Rail Verma and Verter, 2007; McClure et al., 1988; Coleman, 1984;
Glickman, 1983
Marine Iakovou, 2001; Li et al., 1996; Haas and Kichner, 1987
Road + rail Glickman, 1988




Erkut and Alp, 2006; Chang et al., 2005MST; Zografos
and Androutsopoulos, 2004M; Zografos and Androutsopou-
los, 2002M; Miller-Hooks and Mahmassani, 2000ST; Bowler
and Mahmassani, 1998T; (Miller-Hooks and Mahmassani,
1998)ST; Sulijoadikusumo and Nozick, 1998MT; (Nozick et
al., 1997)MT; Smith, 1987M; Cox and Turnquist, 1986
Global routing Road Carotenuto, et al. (2007a, 2007b); Dell’Olmo et al., 2005;
Akgün et al., 2000; Marianov and ReVelle, 1998; Lindner-
Dutton et al., 1991; Gopalan et al. (1990a, 1990b); Zografos
and Davis, 1989
Marine Iakovou et al., 1999
Cwith security consideration;
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Table 2c.
A classification of hazmat transportation models – combined facility location and routing
Alumur and Kara, 2007; Cappanera et al., 2004; Berman et al., 2000; Giannikos, 1998M; Helander and
Melachrinoudis, 1997; List and Turnquist, 1998; Current and Ratick, 1995M; Jacobs and Warmerdam,
1994; Boffey and Karkazis, 1993; Stowers and Palekar, 1993; List and Mirchandani, 1991M; List et al.,




A classification of hazmat transportation models – network design
Berman et al., 2007; Erkut and Alp, 2006; Erkut and Gzara, 2005; Erkut and Ingolfsson, 2005; Verter
and Kara, 2005; Kara and Verter, 2004
3 Risk assessment
Risk is the primary ingredient that separates hazmat transportation prob-
lems from other transportation problems. In this section we will provide a de-
tailed treatment of how risk is incorporated into hazmat transport models,
starting with the basic building blocks and moving our way into risk assess-
ment along a route. In the context of hazmat transport, risk is a measure of
the probability and severity of harm to an exposed receptor due to potential
undesired events involving a hazmat (Alp, 1995). The exposed receptor can be
a person, the environment, or properties in the vicinity. The undesired event in
this context is the release of a hazmat due to a transport accident. The conse-
quence of a hazmat release can be a health effect (death, injury, or long-term
effects due to exposure), property loss, an environmental effect (such as soil
contamination or health impacts on flora and fauna), an evacuation of nearby
population in anticipation of imminent danger, or stoppage of traffic along the
impacted route.
Risk assessment can be qualitative or quantitative. Qualitative risk assess-
ment deals with the identification of possible accident scenarios and attempts
to estimate the undesirable consequences. It is usually necessitated by a lack
of reliable data to estimate accident probabilities and consequence measures.
The goal is to identify events that appear to be most likely and those with the
most severe consequences, and focus on them for further analysis. It may be
the only option in the absence of data – for example, assessing the risks due
to the location of a permanent nuclear waste repository. While hazmat trans-
port analysts are known to complain about the quality of their data (we will
return to this topic later in this section), they do have access to considerable
historical information on accident frequencies and fairly accurate consequence
models for hazmat releases in case of accidents in many developed countries.
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Due to this, and the necessity of quantitative information for OR models, in
this section we focus on quantitative risk assessment.
Quantitative risk assessment (QRA) involves the following key steps:
(1) hazard and exposed receptor identification;
(2) frequency analysis; and
(3) consequence modeling and risk calculation.
Identification of hazard refers to identifying the potential sources of release
of contaminants into the environment, the types (e.g., thermal radiation due to
jet and pool fires and fireballs, explosions, flying pieces of metals or other ob-
jects due to blast waves, toxic clouds, and flame) and quantities of compounds
that are emitted or released, and the potential health and safety effects as-
sociated with each substance. In some cases (for example, when a release of
carcinogenic substances is involved), we also need to investigate the long-term
health risks of a hazmat accident. Examination of risks on different types of
exposed receptor is also essential to cover different response characteristics in
the risk assessment.
The language of QRA is one of frequencies and consequences, and unlike
in qualitative risk analysis, QRA results in a numerical assessment of risks in-
volved, for example, an expected number of individuals impacted per year. In
the next two sections we discuss frequency analysis and consequence modeling
along with risk calculation.
3.1 Frequency analysis
The frequency analysis involves (a) determining the probability of an unde-
sirable event; (b) determining the level of potential receptor exposure, given
the nature of the event; and (c) estimating the degree of severity, given the level
of exposure (Ang and Briscoe, 1989). Each stage of this assessment requires
the calculation of a probability distribution, with stage (b) and (c) involving
conditional distributions. Consider a unit road segment. Suppose that there is
only one type of accident, release, incident, and consequence. Let A be the
accident event that involves a hazmat transporter, M the release event, and
I the incident event. Suppose that the consequence of the hazmat release is
expressed in terms of the number of injuries. We denote the event of an injury
to an individual as D. Using Bayes’ theorem, we obtain the probability of an
injury resulting from an accident related to the hazmat as
p(AM ID) = p(D|AM I)p(AM I)
= p(D|AM I)p(I|AM)p(AM)
(3.1)= p(D|AM I)p(I|AM)p(M|A)p(A)
where p(E) denotes the probability of the event E occurring on the road seg-
ment and p(E|F) the associated conditional probability. Despite its simplicity,
the above model already contains many of the necessary elements for hazmat
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risk assessment. For example, Chow et al. (1990) used a Bayesian model that
includes multiple levels of event severity to predict severe nuclear accidents
and to estimate the associate risks. Glickman (1991) used a Bayesian model
in the assessment of the risks of highway transportation of flammable liquid
chemicals in bulk.
Furthermore, let slm denote the number of shipments of hazmat m on
road segment l per year. Note that a highway transport route from the ori-
gin to the destination consists of finitely many road segments. The product
slmpl(AMm ID) determines the frequency of the occurrence of the haz-
ardous release event that measures the individual risk for a person in the
neighborhood of road segment l. Usually, the individual risk is defined as the
yearly death frequency for an average individual at a certain distance from
the impact area (see, e.g., Mumpower, 1986; Leonelli et al., 2000). Although
no universally accepted individual risk criteria exist, one tends to compare the
risk of death to de minimis of 10−6 to 10−5 deaths per year (Mumpower, 1986).
Hazmat incidents usually impact a number of individuals. Hence, we need to
move from individual risk toward societal risk. The societal risk is a character-
istic of the hazardous activity in combination with its populated surroundings.
There are several ways to express societal risk. Perhaps the simplest method
is to compute the expected number of impacted individuals by multiplying the
probability of impact per person with the number of persons present in the im-
pact zone. Hence, the societal risk (or just risk for short) on road segment l of





(3.2)× pl(Mm|A)pl(A)POPl(x y) dx dy
where pl(Dxy |AMm I) is the probability that individuals on location (x y)
in the impact area L will be dead due to the incident on a route segment l and
POPl(x y) is the population density on location (x y) in the neighborhood of
road segment l. By assuming that each individual in the affected population
will incur the same risk, Rlm can be simply expressed as
(3.3)Rlm := slmpl(D|AMm I)pl(I|AMm)pl(Mm|A)pl(A)POPl
Thus, if few people are present around the hazardous activity, the societal risk
may be close to zero, whereas the individual risk may be quite high.
While this expected consequence is a convenient measure for OR models,
the risk assessment literature prefers a richer measure, namely the FN-curve
which expands the point estimate of the expectation to the entire distribution.
To produce an FN-curve, one has to compute the probability that a group
of more than N persons would be impacted due to a hazmat accident, for
all levels of N . The risk level is communicated by the FN-curve, a graph
with the ordinate representing the cumulative frequency distribution F of the
hazardous release events which result in at least N number of impacts (e.g.,
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Fig. 4. A conditional FN-curve (given an evacuation incident).
number of fatalities or number of people evacuated) and abscissa representing
the consequence (N impacts). Furthermore, if F is a conditional cumulative
frequency distribution, then the associated FN-curve is called the conditional
FN-curve. Figure 4 shows a conditional FN-curve for PCB transport through
Edmonton, Canada (Erkut and Verter, 1995b). The ordinate F is the annual
cumulative frequency of incidents with at least N evacuations conditioned on
the occurrence of an evacuation incident in the city. This figure shows that
if an evacuation incident occurs, then the probability of evacuating more than
500 people is 0.8. Some countries (such as Denmark, Netherlands and the UK)
use decision rules for hazmat installations based FN-curves (Jonkman et al.,
2003).
Clearly, more than one type of accident, release, incident, and consequence
can occur during the hazmat transport activity. For example, a release of flam-
mable liquid can lead to a variety of incidents such as a spill, a fire, or an
explosion. To accommodate this, let A, M, I , and C denote the set of pos-
sible accidents, releases, incidents, and consequences that may occur on road
segment l. Suppose that all consequences (injuries and fatalities, property
damage, and environmental damage) can be expressed in monetary terms (see
Section 3.2.3). Then, the hazmat transport risk associated with road segment l











where CONSc is the possible c-type consequence.
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To summarize, we started with individual risk due to a single incident, then
we moved on to risk due to multiple shipments, and on to societal risk, and
finally to societal risk with multiple incidents.
However, in practice, researchers frequently neglect these conditional prob-
abilities and simplify the analysis by considering the expected loss (or the
worst-case loss) as the measure of risk. The expected value is calculated as the
product of the probability of a release accident and the consequence of the
incident (List et al., 1991). Hence the hazmat transport risk associated with





where clm is the undesirable consequence due to the release of hazmat m on
road segment l. This risk model is sometimes referred to as the technical risk
(Erkut and Verter, 1998). The US DOT use this expected loss definition in
their guidelines for transporting hazmats (US DOT, 1994). These simplifica-
tions are mainly due to the lack and inaccuracy of accident and exposure data.
As it is clear from the discussion above, QRA depends heavily on an esti-
mation of probabilities. There are two primary means to estimate the accident,
release, and incident probabilities: historical frequencies and logical diagrams
(fault tree and event tree analysis).
Historical frequencies
We can use the number of hazmat transport accidents in a given time pe-
riod and the total distance traveled by hazmat trucks in the same time period
to calculate the accident rate on a unit road segment (i.e., accidents per km).
The hazmat accident probability on road segment l, pl(A), can be obtained
by multiplying the accident rate by the length of road segment l. To esti-
mate pl(Mm|A), we need to calculate the percentage of hazmat accidents
that result in a release of hazmat m. Similarly, we can use historical data to
estimate pl(I|AMm) and pl(D|AMm I). However, the occurrence of an
accident may be influenced by intrinsic factors such as tunnels, rail bridges,
road geometry, weather conditions, and human factors, as well as other fac-
tors correlated to traffic conditions, such as traffic volume and frequency of
hazmat shipment. Consequently, some locations are more vulnerable to ac-
cidents than others. Therefore, a careful analysis should be done prior to
the use of historical data. The rarity of hazmat accidents may result in in-
sufficient information to determine whether historical figures are relevant to
the circumstances of concern, particularly regarding rare catastrophic acci-
dents. Moreover, in estimating the associate probabilities on road segment l
of a hazmat transportation route, the dependency to the impedances of pre-
ceding road segments should also be taken into account (Kara et al., 2003;
Verter and Kara, 2001). We will discuss this dependency issue in more detail in
Section 3.3.1.
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Logical diagram-based techniques
An alternative way to estimate the frequency (and possibly consequences)
of hazmat release incidents is the use of logical diagram-based techniques,
namely fault tree and event tree analysis. Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is a top-
down analysis tool to identify the causes of events and to quantify various
accident scenarios that would cause the system fail. It starts with an identified
hazard (e.g., chlorine release due to a transport accident) as the root of a tree
(or top event) and works backward to determine its possible causes (e.g., col-
lision accident, derailment, and relief valve poorly sealed) using two logical
functions: OR and AND. The causative events are laid out in a tree with the
branches connected by gates comprising one of these logical functions. The
OR gate represents the union of events attached to the gate. An OR gate can
have any number of inputs (branches). The event above the gate is realized if
any one or more of the inputs occur. The AND gate represents the intersec-
tion of events attached to the gate. An AND gate can also have any number
of inputs, but the event above the gate is only realized if all the inputs occur.
Moreover, several fault trees can be combined into a single complex fault tree.
FTA enables us to determine the probability of the top event on the basis of
the probabilities of the basic events (e.g., p(D|AM I) in (3.1), where death
of an individual in hazmat transport accident is the top event) for which suffi-
cient historical data exist or expert judgments are reliable.
Event Tree Analysis (ETA), on the other hand, is a bottom-up analysis tool.
It takes at its starting point the event that can affect the system (e.g., an initial
release of hazmat) and tracks them forward through sequences of interfacing
system components to determine their possible consequences. It examines all
possible responses to the initiating event, such as the functioning, failure, or
partial failure of subsystems or different systems, in a tree structure with the
branches developing from left to right. Each outcome of the branches is usually
binary (i.e., the outcome occurs or does not occur). By assigning a probability
to each branch, the probabilities of every possible outcome following the ini-
tiating event can be determined. ETA can be used in conjunction with FTA,
called FETA, to identify and quantify the possible consequences of the top
event in fault tree. Figure 5 shows a fault tree in conjunction with an event
tree. For additional details and examples of fault and event tree construction,
we refer to Henley and Kumamoto (1981), Vesely et al. (1981), and Rhyne
(1994).
Boykin et al. (1984) applied FETA to analyze the risks associate with the se-
lection of technology alternatives in the chemical storage system. Pet-Armacost
et al. (1999) used FETA in conjunction with two Monte Carlo simulations
(one uses spreadsheet add-in @RISK and the other uses discrete event simula-
tion software ARENA) to conduct a transportation risk analysis of Hydrazine
in order to determine whether or not a relief valve should be used. FETA
was used to decompose the transport process into its basic components and
to identify the major sources of uncertainty. The event probabilities in the








Fig. 5. A fault tree in conjunction with an event tree for hazmat release (adapted from Alp, 1995).
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not known. The impact of these parameters on the risks of toxic exposure, fire,
and explosion was analyzed through Monte Carlo analysis and analysis of vari-
ance. Rosmuller and Van Gelder (2003) used FETA to conduct a QRA for
the hazmat transportation in the Netherlands. The results were used to for-
mulate appropriate risk and rescue policies. They suggested that emergency
response teams could use the release data for determining impact circles for
road accidents and subsequently decide on detour routes. Moreover, expected
distributions of release quantities could be used to facilitate the training of
hazmat response personnel.
3.2 Consequence modeling and risk calculation
3.2.1 Modeling the impact area
There are many undesirable consequences of a hazmat transportation ac-
cident, such as economic losses, injuries, environmental pollution, damage
to wildlife, and fatalities. These consequences are a function of the impact
area (or exposure zone) and population, property, and environmental assets
within the impact area. The shape and size of an impact area depends not only
on the substance being transported but also on other factors, such as topol-
ogy, weather, and wind speed and direction. Estimating, a priori, the impact
area of a potential accident is difficult. Researchers used different geomet-
ric shapes to model the impact area such as a band of fixed width around
each route segment (e.g., Batta and Chiu, 1988; ReVelle et al., 1991), a cir-
cle (called danger circle), with a substance-dependent radius centered at the
incident location (e.g., Erkut and Verter, 1998; Kara et al., 2003), rectan-
gle around the route segment (e.g., ALK Associates, 1994), and an ellipse
shape based on the Gaussian plume model (e.g., Patel and Horowitz, 1994;
Chakraborty and Armstrong, 1995; Zhang et al., 2000). Figure 6 shows these
four shapes of the impact area that have been used in the literature.
Perhaps the most common approximation of the impact zone is the dan-
ger circle. By moving the danger circle along a route segment between two
nodes (see Kara et al., 2003), we get the fixed-bandwidth approximation and by
cutting off the circular segments at the two ends we get the rectangle approx-
imation. The bandwidth or radius is substance-dependent but it is assumed to
be constant for a given shipment, which means that this approximation does
not consider effect of the distance on the level of impact. One can determine
the radius by considering the evacuation distance (i.e., the initial isolation zone)
when a hazmat incident occurs, for example, 0.8 km for flammable hazmats and
1.6 km for flammable and explosive hazmats (CANUTEC, 2004). The central
assumption in these models is that each individual within the danger zone will
be impacted equally and no one outside of this area will be impacted.
The modeling of an impact area can also be considered from the point
of view of the affected population center. For example, a population center
is commonly modeled as a point on the plane, where all inhabitants of the
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Fig. 6. Possible shapes of impact area around the route segment.
population center are considered to experience the same impact from a haz-
mat incident on a road segment nearby. The impact on this aggregation point
depends on the distance between the point and the incident location. For ex-
ample, the impact can be inversely proportional to the square of the Euclidean
distance between the two points. However, a GIS enables researchers to rep-
resent the spatial distribution of population density more accurately (see, for
example, Figure 8) rather than using aggregation points. Erkut and Verter
(1995b) proposed a model of the spatial distribution of population by using
a polygon. Verter and Kara (2001) incorporated this in a GIS, and developed
a large-scale risk assessment model for the provinces of Ontario and Quebec.
3.2.2 Gaussian plume model
In an airborne hazmat (e.g., chlorine, propane, and ammonia) accident,
the concentration of the airborne contaminant varies with distance from the
source of accident. It will be lower as the gas disperses with distance and wind.
Therefore, the three approaches discussed above can result in poor approxima-
tions of the impact area. In this case, researchers have usually resorted to the
Gaussian plume model (GPM) (Hanna et al., 1993; Patel and Horowitz, 1994;
Chang et al., 1997; Zhang et al., 2000; Puliafito et al., 2003). The Gaussian
plume model is based on several limiting assumptions:
(1) the gas does not change its chemical properties during dispersion;
(2) the terrain is unobstructed and flat;
(3) the ground surface does not absorb the gas;
(4) the wind speed and direction is stable during the dispersion period; and
(5) the emission rate is constant.
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These assumptions certainly limit the application of GPM, for example, as-
sumption (1) restricts the applicability of the GPM to stable chemicals and to
accidents which do not result in an explosion (Zhang et al., 2000). The GPM is
formulated as



























where C is the concentration level (mass per unit volume – μg/m3 or parts
per million – ppm), x is the distance downwind from the source (m), y is the
distance crosswind (perpendicular) from the source (m), z is the elevation of
the destination point (m), he is the elevation of the source (m), Q is the release
rate of pollutant (mass emission rate – g/s or volumetric volume rate – m3/s),
μ is the average wind speed (m/s), σy and σz are the dispersion parameters in
the y and z directions (m).
In hazmat dispersion from traffic accidents, it is usually assumed that the
source is on the ground (i.e., he = 0) and we are interested in the ground
concentration level (i.e., z = 0). Therefore, we obtain











Figure 7 shows bell-shaped curves of concentration levels C(x y) for two dif-
ferent downwind distances: (a) the concentration of the pollutant is high at the
source of the spill (x = 0) and the Gaussian distribution has a pronounced
peak; (b) as the pollutant drifts farther downwind (x  0), it spreads out and
the bell-shape becomes wider and flatter.
The release rate, Q, depends on container volume, hazmat type, and rupture
diameter. To calculate Q, one can use ALOHA (see Section 2.5). ALOHA can
also be used for estimating the concentration level, C(x y), but its results are
only reliable within one hour of the release event, and 10 kilometers from the
release source. The dispersion parameters, σy and σz, can be determined as a
function of downwind distance x (Pasquill and Smith, 1983; Arya, 1999).
The individual risk, that is the probability that an individual at location
j with coordinate (jx jy) will experience an undesirable consequence (such
as evacuation, or injury, or death) as a result of a release at i, pij , can be
represented as a function of the concentration of airborne contaminant at j,
Cij := C(|jx − ix| |jy − iy |). The American Institute of Chemical Engineers
(2000) suggests a probit function to model pij(Cij). Consequently, the social
risk can be obtained by multiplying pij(Cij) with the population size at loca-
tion j.
A simpler alternative way to estimate the consequence of airborne hazmat
accident is to use the standard concentration level to determine the threshold
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(a)
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Fig. 7. The bell-shape of concentration level C(x y): (a) Gaussian distribution at x = 0 and
(b) Gaussian distribution at x  0 (Chakraborty and Armstrong, 1995).
distances for different consequences (e.g., fatalities and injuries), such as Im-
mediately Dangerous to Life and Health (IDLH) (NIOSH, 1994) developed by
the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) and the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). The IDLH-values
represent the maximum concentration from which one could escape without
injury or irreversible health effects (e.g., severe eye or respiratory irritation,
disorientation, or lack of coordination) within 30 minutes of exposure. For ex-
ample, the IDLH-values for carbon dioxide and propane are 40,000 ppm and
2100 ppm respectively. These numbers hold for enclosed spaces (and not open-
air). To be used in an open environment, for example, Verma and Verter (2007)
considered a propane dispersion of 2100 ppm per second and assumed that
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Fig. 8. Population densities within different concentration levels (Zhang et al., 2000).
roughly a 4–5 minute propane exposure at this IDLH level can cause minor
injury while a 30–35 minute exposure can cause major injury or fatality. Us-
ing these assumptions, they defined a fatality zone (if the concentration level
C  4,200,000), an injury zone (if 600,000  C < 4,200,000) and a nonexpo-
sure zone (if C < 600,000) where C is given in ppm. Hence, the threshold
distance is determined by the level curve of the associated hazmat IDLH-value
and the associated consequence can be represented as the function of the pop-
ulation size within the level curve. Figure 8 shows the population densities
within different concentration levels of a single source release.
The following conceptual example demonstrates how an improper assess-
ment of the impact area may lead to a high-risk routing decision. Consider
two east–west routes around a city that may be used for propane shipments:
South (P1) and North (P2) routes (see Figure 9(a)). Assume each route seg-
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Fig. 9. (a) Gaussian plume model vs. (b) danger circle.
ment in both routes has the same incident probability. Suppose these routes
divide the city into three regions A, B, C, where each region has uniform popu-
lation density. Among these regions, suppose that region B is the most densely
populated one and region C is the least densely populated one. Moreover,
suppose that the prevalent wind direction is south-east. Figure 9(b) shows con-
centration contours of route segments in P1 and P2, according to the IDLH
value. Since the population density in the impact area of route P1 is less than
that of P2, one might send propane via route P1. In contrast, if one were to use
a danger circle instead of the Gaussian plume model, neglecting the type of
hazmat and the wind direction, one may select route P2 instead of P1. This de-
cision would expose more people in case of an incident as propane would drift
south-eastwardly into region B. As this simple example demonstrates a careful
analysis is necessary prior to defining the impact area.
3.2.3 Risk cost
To estimate the cost of a hazmat release incident, various consequences
must be considered. The consequences can be categorized into (Abkowitz
et al., 2001; FMCSA, 2001): injuries and fatalities (or often referred to as pop-
ulation exposure), cleanup costs, property damage, evacuation, product loss,
traffic incident delay, and environmental damage. All impacts must be con-
verted to the same unit (for example dollars) to permit comparison and com-
plication of the total impact cost. The discussion of risk costs presented here
deals primarily with hazmat incidents on highways.
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Injuries and fatalities. Finding a dollar value of human life and safety is per-
haps the most difficult and controversial issue. Some find it offensive; others
argue that any dollar value assigned to human life would be too low. Yet it
is possible to estimate the value indirectly. Insurance payments offer a simple
estimate. Perhaps more relevant is the figure used by government agencies to
prioritize their projects that reduce fatalities and injuries. Clearly if an agency
is making a choice between Project A which will save X lives and cost P dol-
lars per year and Project B which will save Y lives and cost Q dollar per year,
they are implicitly using a trade-off value that converts fatalities to dollars –
regardless of whether or not the trade-off is made explicit.
The value of an injury or fatality in a hazmat incident can be estimated from
different perspectives (FMCSA, 2001). For example, one can value an injury
or fatality in terms of lost income and economic productivity to society. The
National Highway Transportation Safety Administration (NHTSA) estimates
the cost of fatalities and injuries by considering both direct and indirect costs
to individuals and to society (NHTSA, 1996). Direct costs include emergency
treatment, initial medical costs, rehabilitation costs, long-term care and treat-
ment, insurance administrative expenses, legal costs, and employer/workplace
costs. Indirect costs are productivity losses in the workplace due to temporary
and permanent disability and decreases in productivity at home resulting from
these disabilities. In 1996 dollars, a fatality costs about $913,000 and a critical
injury costs about $780,000.
In addition to the economic cost components discussed above, The National
Safety Council (NSC) also includes the value of a person’s natural desire to live
longer or to protect the quality of one’s life (NSC, 2003). This value indicates
what people are willing to pay to reduce their safety and health risks. Hence,
the cost estimates include wage and productivity losses, such as wages and
fringe benefits, replacement cost and travel delays caused by the accident; med-
ical expenses, such as doctor fees, hospital charges, cost of medication, future
medical costs, and other emergency medical services; administrative expenses,
such as insurance premiums and paid claims, police and legal costs; motor ve-
hicle damage, such as property damage to vehicles; and employer costs, such
as time lost by uninjured workers, investigation and reporting time, produc-
tion slowdowns, training of replacement workers, and extra costs of overtime
for uninsured workers (FMCSA, 2001). The 2003 estimates of incapacitating
injury and fatality costs are $181,000 and $3,610,000, respectively.
Finally, US DOT values injuries and deaths at the amount they would spend
to avoid an injury or fatality (FMCSA, 2001). This averages out to be $400,000
to avoid an injury requiring hospitalization and $2,800,000 to avoid a fatality.
Cleanup costs. Cleanup costs are assumed to encompass the costs of both
stopping the spread of a spill and removing spilled materials (Abkowitz et al.,
2001; FMCSA, 2001). Such costs vary widely depending on the size, type of ma-
terials, and location of the spill. Some national database systems, such as the
Hazardous Materials Information System (HMIS) of US DOT and The Work-
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place Hazardous Materials Information System (WHMIS) of Health Canada,
can be used as references for the cleanup costs. For the period 1990–1999,
cleanup costs averaged about $24,000 per en-route accident, $1300 per cleanup
for an en-route incident spill, and $260 for an unloading/loading accident and
incident spill cleanup (HMIS database).
Property damage. Property damage encompasses damage to other vehicles,
which may have been involved in the incident, as well as damage to both public
and private property (e.g., private buildings, public utilities, public roadways).
For example, from HMIS database of the period 1990–1999, the average prop-
erty damage for flammable and combustible liquids en-route accidents was
$16,041, while the average property damage for en-route incident spills was
$274. Average property damage for leaks occurring during loading and unload-
ing incidents and accidents was $68. Average property damage for flammable
gases en-route accidents, en-route spills, and loading/unloading incidents were
$3147, $173, and $2315, respectively. For corrosive materials, the average val-
ues for en-route accidents, en-route spill incidents, and loading/unloading in-
cidents were $3104, $67, and $17, respectively (FMCSA, 2001).
Evacuation. There are numerous variables which complicate the estimation
of the cost of evacuation. These include the expense for temporary lodging and
food, losses due to lost wages and business disruptions, inconvenience to the
public, and the cost of agencies assisting in evacuation. A reasonable estimate
would be $1000 per person evacuated (TRB, 1993). This $1000 estimate is also
used by the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) to estimate impacts from
railroad evacuations.
Product loss. Product loss refers to the quantity and value of the haz-
mats lost during a spill. For example, from the HMIS database for period
1990–1999, the average cost of product lost of flammable and combustible
liquids en-route accident related spills was $3208 per spill. Similarly, for flam-
mable gases accidents, the average cost of product lost per en-route accident
related spill was $1140 per spill. Corrosive material spill accidents averaged
$4910 per spill in product loss.
Traffic incident delay. Hazmat spills typically require an emergency response
that causes a significant traffic delay. This type of traffic delay is called in-
cident delay. If traffic volume and incident situation (e.g., the traffic arrival
rate, road capacity reduction, and incident duration) is known, a deterministic
model can be used to estimate the incident delay. For example, Morales (1989)
used a deterministic queueing model and Wirasinghe (1978) and Alp (1995)
used models based on shock-wave theory. Due to its simplicity, the Morales
model is often used by practitioners (see, for example, Abkowitz et al., 2001;
FMCSA, 2001). However, these deterministic models are inappropriate for
prediction of incident delay in real-time situation where the incident duration
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is unknown. In this case, incident delay is best modeled by a random variable
that represents the stochastic characteristics associated with the incident (as in
Fu and Rilett, 1997).
To obtain the associated costs of incident delays, information on the oc-
currence of an incident or the split between trucks and other vehicles on the
various highway systems are required. Earlier studies (Grenzeback et al., 1990)
assumed the hourly cost of incident delay to be about $20 for trucks and $10
for other vehicles, which accounts for the value of a driver’s time and fuel
consumption costs. The total cost traffic incident delay is then obtained by
multiplying this dollar value of incident delay with the total number of person-
hours of delay given by the model discussed above.
Environmental damage. Environmental damage consists of damage to the en-
vironment that remains after the cleanup. This damage can be calculated in
terms of loss of economic productivity, such as agricultural production lost
and/or in loss of habitat or ecosystem deterioration (FMCSA, 2001). The loss
of agricultural productivity can be estimated, for example, using the quantity
of crops that are not grown during a 20-year period due to contamination. Us-
ing wheat as an example, a contaminated field that can produce 35 bushels per
acre/year would result in an (undiscounted) gross income loss of $3500/acre
over a 20-year period assuming a fixed value of $5/bushel. To calculate the
natural resource environmental damage from a hazmat incident is more com-
plicated. We need to know how much material was spilled, where the spill
occurred, and what sort of surface it covered. Using, for example, HMIS data,
one can estimate the dollar cost of this damage.
As the discussion in this section points out, while there are different types of
costs associated with a hazmat transport incident, in most cases all other costs
are dwarfed by the cost of fatalities and injuries and the cost of evacuations
in cases of major spills. Perhaps this is a reason why many OR analysts focus
exclusively on populations inside a danger circle.
3.2.4 Perceived risks
All consequences we discussed so far assume that society is risk-neutral;
i.e., we are indifferent between two consequence distributions, as long as their
expected values are equal. For example, risk neutrality assumes that a sin-
gle incident causing 100 fatalities is equivalent (or equally undesirable to the
society) to 100 incidents causing one fatality each, since in both cases the to-
tal number of fatalities is the same. However, most individuals would judge
a low probability–high consequence (LPHC) event as more undesirable than
a high probability–low consequence (HPLC) event even if the expected con-
sequences of the two events are equal (Erkut and Verter, 1998). Consequently
when dealing with LPHC events, most human decision makers tend to exhibit
risk aversion; a single incident causing 100 fatalities is perceived as much more
undesirable than 100 incidents each causing a single fatality.
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A simple way to incorporate risk attitude to risk models is to add a risk
preference (or tolerance) factor α as an exponent to the consequence values.
For example, if the risk assessment deals with the population exposure, then
the societal risk on road segment l (see (3.2), dropping the hazmat index m)





× (POPl(x y))α dx dy
By considering only one shipment (or one trip) and one type of hazmat spill,
the traditional expected loss model of risk (3.5) can thus be modified as (see,
e.g., Slovic et al., 1984; Abkowitz et al., 1992; Erkut and Verter, 1998; Erkut
and Ingolfsson, 2000):
Rl := pl(POPl)α
Figure 10 shows three different values of α associated with three different
risk preferences: α = 1 models risk neutrality; α > 1 models risk aversion;
and α < 1 models risk-taking behavior. The greater the value of α, the higher
the aversion to the risk of a hazmat incident. The risk-aversion model assumes
that the (i + 1)st life lost is more costly than the ith life lost, for all possible
values of i. Of course as α is increased, any route selection model that operates
with an objective of minimizing total risk is eventually reduced to a model
that minimizes the maximum risk, as shown by the following small example.
Consider a hazmat shipment from an origin O to a destination D. There are
two routes (north and south) between O and D, P1 and P2, each consisting of
two route segments. Suppose that the incident probability and the population
density in the impact area of the two segments of route P1 are (10−4; 25) and
(10−4; 75), and those of P2 are (10−5; 100) and (10−5; 400). The total risks
associated with P1 and P2 are 10−2 and 5×10−3, respectively, and the maximum
risks are 75 × 10−4 and 4 × 10−3, respectively. For α = 1, we select P2, the
route with lower total risk. As α approaches infinity, the problem turns into
one of minimizing the maximum risk, and we select P1. Figure 11 shows how
Fig. 10. Three different risk preferences: α = 1 risk neutral; α > 1 risk aversion; α < 1 risk proneness.
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Fig. 11. Routing decision for different values of α, based on perceived risk.
the optimal routing decision changes from P2 to P1 as the risk-aversion factor α
increases.
The perceived risk model can be thought of as a simple (dis)utility model.
It is possible to model risk disutility in other ways. For example, Kalelkar and
Brinks (1978) proposed an empirical disutility function that was constructed
by using a series of questions posed to decision makers. Erkut and Ingolfsson
(2000) proposed an exponential disutility function to model risk aversion.
3.3 Risk on a hazmat transportation route
Up to this point, we discussed hazmat transport risk in general. Now we dis-
cuss the modeling of risk along an edge, and then along a route, of a transport
network. In other words, we now move from point risk (risk due to accident
at a given point) to linear risk (risk along an edge and route). Consider a road
network G = (NE) with node set N and edge set E. The nodes correspond
to the origin, the destination, road intersections, and population centers and
the edges correspond to road segments connecting two nodes. (We note that
one does not have to model population centers as nodes if one uses a GIS as
discussed earlier.) We first focus our discussion on road transportation, and
then move to hazmat transportation on rail.
Note that in the context of hazmat routing it is desirable that each point on
an edge has the same incident probability and level of consequence (e.g., popu-
lation density). Therefore, a long stretch of a highway that goes through a series
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of population centers and farmland should not be represented as a single edge,
but as a series of edges. Thus, a network to be used for hazmat routing is usu-
ally different from a network to be used for other transport planning purposes.
This difference is quite important since it limits the portability of network data-
bases between different transport applications (Erkut and Verter, 1998). We
first discuss the modeling of risk along an edge.
3.3.1 Edge risk
Erkut and Verter (1998) proposed a risk model that takes into account the
dependency to the impedances of preceding road segments (see also Jin et al.,
1996; Jin and Batta, 1997). Suppose that an edge is a collection of n unit road
segments each with the same incident probability p and consequence c. The
probability p is obtained from (3.1) and the consequence c is determined by
taking a proper impact area of a unit road segment. If, for example, the impact
area of a unit road segment is modeled as a danger circle, then the impact area
of an edge is a semicircular shape with the same radius as the danger circle, as
shown in Figure 12. The vehicle will either have an incident on the first road
segment, or it will make it safely to the second segment. If it makes it safely
to the second segment, it will either have an incident in the second segment,
or it will not, and so on. They assumed that the trip ends if an incident occurs.
Hence, the expected risk associated with this edge would be
(3.6)pc + (1 − p)pc + (1 − p)2pc + · · · + (1 − p)n−1pc
Since the incident probability p is at most on the order of 10−6 per trip
per kilometer (based on North American data, Harwood et al., 1993), we can
approximate
(3.7)ps ∼= 0 for s > 1
Consequently, the risk of hazmat transport on this edge becomes pnc. For
edge i, we can, thus, define the risk as
(3.8)ri = pici
where the probability of an incident on edge i is pi := np, and the associated
consequence is ci := c.
Note that this simple risk model works under an assumption of uniform
incident probability and uniform consequence along an edge. If these two
Fig. 12. Semicircular impact area around link (i j).
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attributes are not uniform, the risk computation on either an edge or an origin–
destination route will be more complicated. In practice, however, this assump-
tion will be valid if we define long stretches of a highway as a series of edges.
(In other words, it is not only the network topology, but also the value of the
edge attributes that define an edge. The edges must be short enough that the
accident probability and the consequence are constant along the entire edge.)
This edge risk definition can be considered as a generalization of the classical
(or traditional) risk definition, which considers risk as an expected loss (see
Section 3.1). The expected loss can be obtained from (3.6) by defining n = 1,
i.e., each unit road segment is considered as an edge of the road network. Next
we will discuss in detail some ways to model and calculate the edge risk.
Recall that according to Equation (3.2), the risk of a hazmat accident on
road segment l can be calculated by considering the probability that individu-
als in neighborhood L (of road segment l) will be affected due to the incident
and the population density in L. A hazmat vehicle at point v on edge (i j)
poses a threat to the population at each point v′ in the impact area L. The
hazmat incident probability pij(v), can be obtained from (3.1) and it is mea-
sured in probability of accident per-unit length of movement. Moreover, let us
assume that the consequence is determined by assuming that the impact area
is a danger circle with radius λ.
The edge-risk formulation can be derived as follows. Let lij denote the
length of edge (i j) and wv′ denote the population density at a point v′. The









1 d(v v′)  λ
0 otherwise




′)pij(v) dv, one can move the origin to node i and rotate
the axes so that edge (i j) lies on the positive abscissa. Denote this integral by
Fij(vv
′). The semicircular area around an edge (i j) consists of four regions
with different expressions to calculate Fij(v′), as shown in Figure 13. We note
that region II is empty when lij > 2λ. If the coordinate of v′ is (xv′ yv′) and
x+(v′) and x−(v′) are the intersections of the abscissa with a circle of radius λ
centered at v′, then
x+(v′) = xv′ +
√
λ2 − y2v′ and x−(v′) = xv′ −
√
λ2 − y2v′
(3.10)if λ > |yv′ |
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Fig. 13. Regions inside the semicircular impact area with radius λ around edge (i j) (Batta and Chiu,
1988).






0 pij(v) dv v
′ is in region I∫ lij
0 pij(v) dv v
′ is in region II∫ lij
x−(v′) pij(v) dv v
′ is in region III∫ x+(vv′)
x−(v′) pij(v) dv v
′ is in region IV
0 v′ is outside the semicircular area





Batta and Chiu (1988) assumed that population centers are located at nodes
and along the edges of the road network. Thus, a hazmat vehicle at point v
on edge (i j) poses a threat to the population at node v′ and/or at point v′′
on edge (i′ j′). Let wv′ denote the population density at node v′, and fkl(v′′)
denote the population density function associated with edge (i′ j′). Moreover,
assume that the function fi′j′(v′′) has been normalized so that its integral from
zero to li′j′ equals one. The nodal risk at node v′, rv′ij , is determined by (3.9)
and the edge risk on edge (i′ j′), ri′j′ij , due to the hazmat transport on edge








δ(v v′′)pij(v) dv dv′′
To calculate the edge risk ri′j′ij , we need to partition edge (i′ j′) into regions
as discussed earlier (see Figure 14). Let consider a point v′′ on (i′ j′), which is
v′′ units from node i′. By definition, the coordinates of this point are
xv′′ = xi′ + (xj′ − xi′) v
′′
li′j′
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Fig. 14. Partition of edge (i′ j′) into regions inside the semicircular impact area with radius λ around
edge (i j).
Using this coordinate and (3.10) and (3.11), one can calculate x+(v′′), x−(v′′),
Fij(v
′′), and finally the edge risk ri′j′ij . Hence, the total risk of a hazmat vehicle









An origin–destination route P for a hazmat shipment is a collection of edges,
where travel on this path can be viewed as a probabilistic experiment as shown
in Figure 15 (see, e.g., Jin et al., 1996; Jin and Batta, 1997; Erkut and Verter,
1998). Similar to the argument used above, a hazmat vehicle will travel along
the ith edge of P only if there is no incident on the first (i − 1) edges of P
(i.e., an incident terminates a trip along P). Suppose that the path P has n
edges. Note that n may represents the length of the path if each edge ei ∈ E,
i = 1     n, has length of one unit. The expected path risk associated with this







where (1−p1)(1−p2) · · · (1−pi−1)pici is the impedance of the ith edge of P .
By this definition, edge impedances are path-dependent.
Using an approximation similar to (3.7), that is, assuming
(3.13)pipj ∼= 0 for all edges i j
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Fig. 15. Partial probability path displaying possible outcomes of a hazmat transport along a path, where
pi is the incident probability and ci is the associated consequence along the ith edge of the path (Erkut
and Verter, 1998).
This model is often referred to as the traditional risk model, since it explic-
itly uses the expected consequence definition of risk. Note that this model is
simple to explain and justify, and it is not data intensive; it requires only one
accident probability and one consequence figure per edge. Furthermore, it is
rather easy to work with in optimization models. In fact, minimizing (3.14) for
a given OD pair in a hazmat transport network is a shortest path problem which
is solved easily for even large networks. For these reasons, most papers on haz-
mat transportation use this traditional risk model (Erkut and Verter, 1998).
The US DOT also uses this approach in their guidelines (US DOT, 1994).
This simple risk model makes a tacit assumption that the hazmat vehicle will
travel along every edge on the path, regardless of what happened on earlier
edges. Consequently, a single hazmat trip can result in several incidents (with
a very small probability). In some cases, though very unlikely, this assumption
is practically reasonable. After a minor incident, the cargo may still be trans-
ported to the destination, perhaps on a different vehicle and/or on different
route. Nevertheless, since incident rates for hazardous materials are very low,
the probability of the conditioning event that an incident has not yet occurred
when an edge i is reached will always be very close to 1. Therefore, the two
assumptions (an incident terminates a trip and an incident does not terminate
a trip) and (3.12) and (3.14), consequently, will differ insignificantly. Erkut
and Verter (1998) point out that this approximation is likely to result in a very
small error (less than 0.25% in most cases) in measuring the incidence proba-
bility along a hazmat transport route. Erkut and Ingolfsson (2000) provide an
upper bound of exp(npmax) − 1 on the percent of error introduced by (3.14)
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< exp(npmax) − 1
For example, for a path P with length 4800 km, using an incident probability
of 10−6 per trip-km, we can compute an upper bound of exp(npmax) − 1 =
exp(0004800) − 1, which is 048%. This upper bound is obtained by assuming
that accidents along any edge i with length li occur according to a spatial Pois-
son process with rate λi per distance unit. Under this assumption, the risk on











where pi = λili. By defining
(3.16)qi := 1 − exp(−pi)
for all edges i, (3.15) reduces to (3.12) with qi replacing pi.
Although the traditional risk model has been the most popular one, many
other hazmat transport risk models have been proposed in the literature. Ta-
ble 3 summarizes nine models and cites studies that have used each model.
Each of the seven models that use probabilities are based on approxima-
tion (3.13), even though this approximation is usually not mentioned explicitly.
We will refer to the alternate expressions of these seven models without using
approximation (3.13) as “exact.” Most of the models use population exposure
as the consequence measure. In the population exposure model, ci denotes
the total population in the rectangle shape impact area that stretches along
edge i. Other models use the circle-shaped impact area. Based on the empiri-
cal analysis on the US road network, Erkut and Verter (1998) suggest that the
choice of risk model is important because it effects the path selection decision
and the optimal path for a certain criterion can perform very poorly under an-
other. Therefore, researchers as well as practitioners must pay considerable
attention to the risk modeling in hazmat transport.
In addition to the path risk models summarized in Table 3, Jin and Batta
(1997) proposed six exact risk models, which relate the number of shipments
or trips S that need to be made and the threshold number of accidents T . The
shipments cease after T accidents occur or S trips have been made, whichever
come first. The hazmat shipments are considered as a sequence of independent
Bernoulli trials. Moreover, it is assumed that a trip is over if an accident occurs
on that trip or the destination is reached. Here, we provide a summary of these
risk models and refer the reader to Jin and Batta (1997) for more detail.
• Expected consequence of each trip given that shipment will continue
no matter how many accidents occur (i.e., when S = T = ∞).
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Table 3.
Alternative models of path risk (adapted from Erkut and Ingolfsson, 2005)
Model Approximation approach Satisfy axioms?
(approximation/
exact model)
Y = yes; N = no;
NA = not applicable
Sample references




i=1 pici Y/N Y/N Y/N Batta and Chiu, 1988;
US DOT, 1994;
Alp, 1995;




i=1 ci NA/Y NA/Y NA/Y Batta and Chiu, 1988;




i=1 pi Y/Y Y/Y Y/Y Saccomanno and
Chan, 1985;










i=1 pi N/N N/N N/N Sivakumar et al. 1993,
1995;























j=i exp(pj) NA/Y NA/N NA/Y Erkut and Ingolfsson,
2005
Note: The three axioms tabulated here are discussed in the next subsection.
• Expected total consequence given that shipments will cease either
when T accidents occur or S shipments are finished (i.e., when T <
S < ∞).
• Expected total consequence given that shipments will cease when T ac-
cidents have occurred (i.e., when T < ∞ and S = ∞).
• Expected total consequence given that shipments will cease when T ac-
cidents have occurred (i.e., when T < ∞ and S = ∞) and parameters
change after an accident.
• Expected consequence per trip given that shipments will cease when
T accidents have occurred (i.e., when T < ∞ and S = ∞).
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• Expected number of trips between two successive accidents.
Most of the exact expressions in Jin and Batta (1997) are too complicated
for optimization purposes, and hence only the associated approximate models
are of interest for practical purposes. Yet, approximations for the fourth and
fifth models above are still not available. Further research on situation-specific
models, such as the six listed above, is warranted.
We now discuss briefly the last three rows in Table 3, which are the most
recently proposed hazmat transport risk models.
Expected disutility model. The disutility model incorporates the risk aversion
of the society toward hazmat incidents, especially the catastrophic incidents
(incidents with very large consequences). Erkut and Ingolfsson (2000) assumed
that hazmat incidents occur according to a spatial, nonhomogeneous Pois-
son process defined over the edges of the network. Let Ni and Xi denote
the number of hazmat incidents that occur on the ith edge and the num-
ber of people affected by a hazmat incident on the ith edge, respectively, of
path P , where Ni has a Poisson distribution with a parameter pi, the incident
probability on ith edge of path P. We can thus define Xi = ciNi, where ci de-
notes the associate population exposure. The disutility function is defined as
u(X) := exp(αX), where the constant α > 0 is a measure of catastrophe aver-
sion. The higher the values of α, the more extreme the catastrophe aversion.
By assuming that a single trip can result in several incidents, the expected disu-
tility for a path P can be obtained as E(u(X)) = exp[∑ni=1 pi(exp(αci) − 1)].
Minimizing E(u(X)) is then equivalent to minimizing the summation in the ex-
ponent, i.e.,
∑n
i=1 pi(exp(αci) − 1). Hence, finding a minimum disutility path
is equivalent to finding a shortest path with edge attribute pi(exp(αci)−1). The
magnitude of the edge attributes can become very large. For example, suppose
the population exposure is 10,000, the incident probability is 10−6, and the risk
aversion constant is 0.01. Then, the edge attribute is 10−6(exp(100)−1) ≈ 1036.
As the risk aversion constant α increases, the edge attribute will approach infin-
ity. Consequently, this will ban the associated edge from consideration during
a route selection process that seeks a finite solution. Under an assumption that
an incident terminates the trip, the expected utility for a path P (i.e., the exact





















 ei ∈ P
denotes the incident probability on edge i conditioned that no incident oc-
curred on the first (i − 1) edges. By definition, ri are path dependent.
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Mean–variance model. Many available risk models are based solely on the ex-
pected value of the risk and ignore how risk may deviate from the mean value.
Sivakumar and Batta (1994) proposed a risk model that identifies the least
expected length path subject to the constraint that the variance of the path
length is within a pre-specified threshold. The model is formalized as an inte-
ger programming problem with linear objective function and both linear and
nonlinear constraints. The nonlinear constraints contain quadratic terms which
account for the covariance of length between two edges. Since the covariance
terms can be negative, subtour elimination constraints are added to ensure
a simple-path solution. The authors developed an efficient solution procedure,
based on the Lagrange multipliers, to solve the equivalent linear integer pro-
gramming problem, which is obtained by linearizing the quadratic terms.
Under the same Poisson distribution for the incident rates as in the disutil-
ity model, Erkut and Ingolfsson (2000) proposed a risk model that takes into
account both the expected value and variance of the number of people af-
fected by an incident. Using the same definition of Xi, Ni, and ci, and assuming
that a single trip can result in several incidents (i.e., the approximate model),
the expected value and the variance of X(P), the total number of people af-
fected by incidents caused by travel along P , are E[X(P)] = ∑ni=1 cipi and
Var[X(P)] = ∑ni=1 c2i pi. The associate exact models are E[X(P)] = ∑ni=1 ciri
and Var[X(P)] = ∑ni=1 c2i ri − (∑ni=1 ciri)2, where ri are defined as in (3.17).
One can consider these two measures E[X(P)] and Var[X(P)] simultane-
ously in a multiobjective model and search for paths that are Pareto-optimal
with respect to both E[X(P)] and Var[X(P)]. To deal with the multiobjective
model, one can use the weighted sum technique and obtain a disutility model
E[X(P)] +βVar[X(P)] for a given constant β. By minimizing this for several
values of β, several Pareto-optimal paths can be found.
Demand satisfaction model. When a hazmat is transported to satisfy a de-
mand (e.g., a shipment of chlorine from a producer to a chemical processing
plant), an incident will result in a subsequent shipment. Hence, we must con-
sider the possibility of multiple trips to fulfill the demand. Erkut and Ingolfsson
(2005) proposed a simple demand satisfaction model by assuming that an in-
cident will terminate a trip (i.e., referring to exact model) and a new shipment
must be arranged to fulfill the demand. The exact probability that transport
along a path P results in at least one incident is




where qi are defined as in (3.16). By assuming that this probability is indepen-
dent of any previous trips that were terminated by an incident, then one can
consider each trip as a Bernoulli trial, with probability 1−p̄(P) = ∏ni=1(1−qi)
of success in any given trial. The number of trips required (on the same path)
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before the first success (i.e., trip arrives at the destination safely) will then fol-
lows a geometric distribution with expected value 1/
∏n
i=1(1 − qi). By taking
the expected consequence per trip as in (3.15), the expected total consequence





j=1 (1 − qj)qici∏n








The expression in (3.18) has the following intuitive interpretation: the term qici
is the expected risk associated with traversing edge i once and the term∏n
j=i(1 − qj)−1 is the expected number of times that edge i and the subse-
quent edges on the path must be traversed before the shipment reaches the
destination.
3.3.3 Path risk axioms
Now, we will discuss three important axioms which can be used to assess the
merits of the different models listed in Table 3. Define v(P) to be an evaluation
function that operates on path P (such as distance, cost, or risk). Let P1 denote
the set of all paths between an origin O1 and a destination D1, and P2 denote
the set of all paths between an origin O2 and a destination D2. Let assume that
for any P1 ∈ P1 there is P2 ∈ P2 such that P1 ⊂ P2.
Axiom 1 (Monotonicity axiom for path evaluation models (Erkut, 1995)). If
a path P1 is contained in a path P2, then v(P1)  v(P2).




v(P) 	⇒ v(P1) = min
P∈P1
v(P)
For the third axiom, we assume that v(P) is a function of K edge vec-
tor attributes uk(P) of size n, the number of edges in P , i.e., v(P) =
f (u1(P)     uK(P)). For example, the attributes of any edge in P can be
the incident probability and its associated consequence. In this case, we have
K = 2.
Axiom 3 (Attribute monotonicity axiom (Erkut and Verter, 1998)). If hk, k =
1    K, are nonnegative vector of reals of size n, then
f
(




u1(P) + h1     uK(P) + hK
)

The first axiom implies that the evaluation value of a path will not decrease
as edges are added to the path. Clearly additive value functions (e.g., distance,
cost, travel time) satisfy this monotonicity axiom. The second axiom is merely
a restatement of Bellman’s optimality principle that implies a concatenating
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property of the shortest path. That is, all subpaths of an optimal path should
themselves be optimal. Evaluation functions that satisfy Axiom 2 are called
order-preserving functions. The third axiom states that the path evaluation func-
tion is a nondecreasing function of edge attributes. Consequently, path risk
is a nondecreasing function of edge incident probabilities and edge conse-
quences, i.e., increased probability or consequence on an edge cannot result
in reduced path risk.
One of the nine models in Table 3, namely the conditional risk model, vio-
lates all three axioms. Erkut (1995) and Erkut and Verter (1998) argued that
this model has some undesirable properties which make the model inappro-
priate for planning of hazmat shipments. For example, increasing the accident
probability on a link may reduce the conditional risk of a route that includes
that link.
We now consider the remaining eight models in Table 3. Most of the
approximate versions of the models listed in Table 3 satisfy all three of
these axioms. However, without assumption (3.7) or (3.13), most of the “ex-
act” models containing probabilities do not satisfy the axioms. For example,
consider the exact version of the traditional risk model defined in (3.12).
One can easily construct a simple example to demonstrate that looping re-
duces the risk (see, e.g., Boffey and Karkazis, 1995; Erkut and Verter, 1998;
Erkut and Ingolfsson, 2005). A loop in hazmat route is clearly undesirable
(and indefensible). Therefore when using this exact model one must restrict
the feasible set to loopless paths (as in Boffey and Karkazis, 1995). However,
if one makes assumption (3.7), looping will not occur. Hence, the approximate
version of the traditional risk model does not have the undesirable property of
the exact version.
The simple example in Figure 16 demonstrates how the exact traditional
risk model may result in an indefensible route selection. Node 1 is the origin
and node 4 is the destination. The incident probabilities and consequences are
given along the edges.
The exact risks associated with the two paths are as follows:
Path(1 2 4) :
10−4 × 10 + (1 − 10−4) × 10−4 × 110000 = 109999
Path(1 3 4) : 1 × 10 + 0 = 10
Hence, the exact version of the traditional risk model would select
Path(1 3 4), and this selection is guaranteed to result in an incident. The
downstream consequences on edges (2 4) and (3 4) are so high that the model
chooses the path which guarantees the truck will not reach the downstream
edges. Such a model is not suitable for decision making.
In general, in spite of their more realistic assumption (i.e., an incident will
terminate the trip) most of the exact versions of risk models have some puz-
zling properties and they may be unsuitable for hazmat transportation plan-
ning. We suggest that researchers and practitioners consider the properties of
the risk models carefully before selecting one.
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Fig. 16. Numerical example to demonstrate an undesirable property of the exact traditional risk model.
4 Routing and scheduling
Routing hazmat shipments involves a selection among the alternative paths
between origin–destination pairs. From a carrier’s perspective, shipment con-
tracts can be considered independently and a routing decision needs to be
made for each shipment, which we call the local route planning problem. A ship-
ment typically involves multiple vehicles that have to be scheduled. Since the
risk factors pertaining to each alternative route (such as accident probability
and population exposure) can vary with time, the vehicle routing and schedul-
ing decisions are intertwined, which we call the local routing and scheduling
problem. At the macro level, hazmat routing is a “many to many” routing prob-
lem with multiple origins and an even greater number of destinations (List and
Abkowitz, 1986). In the sequel, we refer to this problem as global route plan-
ning.
The local routing problem is to select the route(s) between a given origin–
destination pair for a given hazmat, transport mode, and vehicle type. Thus, for
each shipment order, this problem focuses on a single commodity and a single
origin–destination route plan. Since these plans are often made without taking
into consideration the big picture, certain links of the transport network tend to
be overloaded with hazmat traffic. This could result in a considerable increase
of accident probabilities on some road links as well as leading to inequity in
the spatial distribution of risk. Although large-scale hazmat carriers are known
to consider transport risk in their routing and scheduling decisions (Verter and
Erkut, 1997), transport costs remain as the carriers’ main focus.
In contrast, the government (municipal, state/provincial, or federal) has to
consider the global problem by taking into account all shipments in its juris-
diction. This leads to a harder class of problems that involve multicommodity
and multiple origin–destination routing decisions. In addition to the total risk
imposed on the public and environment, a government agency may need to
consider promoting equity in the spatial distribution of risk. This becomes cru-
cial in the event that certain population zones are exposed to intolerable levels
of risk as a result of the carriers’ routing and scheduling decisions. The gov-
ernments’ task is further complicated by the need to keep the transport sector
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economically viable – despite the regulations to ensure public safety – since
dangerous goods shipments are an integral part of our industrial lifestyle.
Hazmat local route planning has attracted the attention of many OR re-
searchers. The existing local route planning models cover a wide area that
includes different transport modes: road (e.g., Akgün et al., 2000; Kara et al.,
2003), rail (e.g., Glickman, 1983; Verma and Verter, 2007), water (e.g., Iakovou
et al., 1999; Iakovou, 2001); deterministic (e.g., Batta and Chiu, 1988; ReVelle
et al., 1991) or stochastic models (e.g., Miller-Hooks and Mahmassani, 1998;
Erkut and Ingolfsson, 2000); and single objective (Erkut and Verter, 1998;
Erkut and Ingolfsson, 2005) or multiple objective models (e.g., Sherali et al.,
1997; Marianov and ReVelle, 1998). Tables 2(a–d) provides a more complete
list of references.
The local routing models fail to capture the dynamic nature of transport
risk factors at the tactical level (e.g., traffic conditions, population density, and
weather conditions). Moreover, most of these risk factors cannot be known a
priori with certainty. They are both time-dependent and stochastic in nature;
i.e., they are random variables with probability distribution functions that vary
with time. Therefore, the local routing and scheduling problem is best mod-
eled as a path selection problem in a stochastic time-varying network (see, for
example, Hall, 1986; Fu and Rilett, 1998; Miller-Hooks and Mahmassani, 1998;
Miller-Hooks, 2001).
The global route planning problem has attained relatively little attention in
the literature, much less compared to the local route planning problem. The re-
sults in this area include the works of Gopalan et al. (1990b), Lindner-Dutton
et al. (1991), Marianov and ReVelle (1998), and Iakovou et al. (1999). The
works of Akgün et al. (2000) and Dell’Olmo et al. (2005) on the problem of
finding a number of spatially dissimilar paths between an origin and a destina-
tion can also be considered in this area.
The rest of this section provides a discussion on the known models and so-
lution algorithms pertaining to the three problem categories discussed above.
4.1 Local routing problems
As we have discussed in Section 3, almost all approximate versions of the
path evaluation functions listed in Table 3 are additive and satisfy the optimal-
ity principle (i.e., Axiom 2). Therefore, the static, deterministic and single ob-
jective local routing problems that minimize those evaluation functions reduce
to the classical shortest path problem. Consequently, a label-setting algorithm
(e.g., Djikstra’s algorithm) can simply be applied to find an optimal route.
Most of the exact versions of these path evaluation functions, on the other
hand, do not satisfy Axiom 2. Therefore, Djikstra’s algorithm cannot be ap-
plied directly to find an optimal route. Kara et al. (2003) proposed a simple
modification of Djikstra’s algorithm to find a route that minimizes the ex-
act version of the path incident probability. The modification relies on the
adjustment of the link attribute that is used to update the node label and
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the scanning process. The algorithm is called the impedance-adjusting node
labeling shortest path algorithm and is explained briefly as follows. Let P =
{(i1 i2) (i2 i3)     (in−1 in)} with i1 the origin node and in the destination
node, and let q(ik) denote the probability of safely arriving at node ik of P .
From (3.12), we obtain q(ik) = q(ik−1)(1 − pik−1ik) for k = 2     n, where
pik−1ik denotes the incident probability of (ik−1 ik) and q(i1) := 1. The at-
tribute aij of each link (i j) is defined as aij := q(i)pij . During the scanning
process of node i, aij for each (i j) is recomputed. This new value is used
to update the node label θj of node j. If the current value of θj is greater
than θi + aij , then we set θj := θi + aij , q(j) := q(i)(1 − pij) and update
the predecessor of node j. This modified algorithm has the same computa-
tional complexity as that of Djikstra’s. Kara et al. (2003) also proposed the
impedance-adjusting link labeling algorithm to minimize the path population
exposure. This algorithm eliminates the errors resulting from double-counting
of population exposure, which is caused by the network topology. Using a sim-
ilar modification technique to the impedance-adjusting node labeling shortest
path algorithm, Djikstra’s algorithm can be used to solve the local routing prob-
lem with the exact version of perceived risk, the expected disutility, and the
mean-variance path evaluation functions.
4.1.1 Rail transport
A significant majority of the literature on hazmat routing focus on road ship-
ments. This is not surprising, since trucks account for the largest percentage of
hazmat shipments, as discussed in Section 1. Although train shipments can
reach comparable levels to truck shipments from a total tonnage perspective
(particularly in Europe and Canada), they received considerably less atten-
tion from researchers. Remarkably, the literature on marine, air, and pipeline
transport of dangerous goods is in its infancy. McClure et al. (1988) pointed
out a number of differences between rail and highway routing of hazmat trans-
portation. Rail infrastructure is typically owned and maintained by private rail
companies. Consequently, railroad networks are sparse and do not contain
as many potential alternative routes as highway networks. More importantly,
railroads do not have tracks circumventing major population centers that are
comparable to interstate beltways around metropolitan areas. A given ship-
ment is likely to be handled by more than one railroad carrier, whereas truck
shipments are usually limited to a single company. The rail carriers are mo-
tivated to maximize their portion of the movement. In a recent paper, Verma
and Verter (2007) highlighted additional differences between the two transport
modes. A train usually carries nonhazardous and hazardous cargo together,
whereas these two types of cargo are almost never mixed in a truck shipment.
Furthermore, a rail tank car has roughly three times the capacity of a truck-
tanker (80 tons and 25–30 tons respectively) and the number of hazmat railcars
varies significantly among different trains. Another important characteristic of
trains is the possibility of incidents that involve multiple railcars. Verma and
Verter (2007) noted that there is an average of about one major railroad ac-
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cident per year during the 1990–2003 period in the United States. Thus, there
is a need for the development of risk assessment and routing procedures that
incorporate the differentiating features of railroad hazmat shipments.
The academic literature has mostly focused on the comparison of rail and
road from the viewpoint of hazmat transport risk. For example, Glickman
(1988) observed that the accident rate for significant spills (when release
quantities exceed 5 gallons or 40 pounds) is higher for truck tankers than
for rail tank cars and that rail tank cars are more prone to small spills.
Saccomanno et al. (1989) showed that the safer mode varies with the haz-
mat being shipped and differing volumes complicate comparison between the
two transport modes. Leeming and Saccomanno (1994) reported that although
hazmat railway shipments pose more risk to residents in the vicinity of railroad
tracks, the total risk of these two transport modes does not differ significantly.
Their conclusion is based on a single case study in England. In summary, there
is no consensus among researchers with regards to the dominant transport
mode in terms of public and environmental safety.
Over the past three decades, railroad industry has focused on reducing the
frequency of tank car accidents as well as the likelihood of releases in the event
of an accident – rather than routing and scheduling of trains with potentially
hazardous cargo. The industry’s most recent initiatives have aimed at improv-
ing tank car safety at the design stage. By studying the risks associated with
nonpressurized materials, Raj and Pritchard (2000) report that the DOT-105
tank car design constitutes a safer option than DOT-111. Barkan et al. (2000)
showed that tank cars equipped with surge pressure reduction devices expe-
rienced lower release rates than those without this technology. Barkan et al.
(2003) undertook a study to identify proxy variables that can be used to predict
circumstances most likely to lead to a hazmat release accident. They concluded
that the speed of derailment and the number of derailed cars are highly corre-
lated with hazmat release.
4.2 Multiobjective approaches to local routing
As discussed in Section 1, hazmat transportation is multiobjective in nature
with multiple stakeholders. In general, there is no solution that simultaneously
optimizes all the conflicting objective functions in a multiobjective problem.
Instead, a set of nondominated solutions (or Pareto-optimal solutions) can be
determined. A Pareto-optimal solution is one where we cannot improve on an
objective without worsening at least one other objective. Local route planning
often involves finding the set of Pareto-optimal routes between a given origin–
destination pair. In the event that the decision maker’s preferences among the
conflicting objectives are available in advance, the problem can be reduced to
a single objective optimization problem (via utility theory). The most preferred
solution can then be identified among the Pareto-optimal solutions so as to max-
imize the preference function of the decision maker.
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Nembhard and White (1997) considered the problem of determining the
most preferred path that maximizes a multiattribute, nonorder-preserving
value function both with and without intermediate stops. For the no-stop case,
the problem is solved approximately by applying the dynamic programming al-
gorithm as if a subpath of an optimal path were always optimal (i.e., by using
an approximate method on the exact problem). The intermediate-stop case
is solved approximately by approximating the nonorder preserving criterion
with the linear order-preserving criterion and by properly applying the dynamic
programming algorithm (i.e., by using an exact method on the approximated
problem). Marianov and ReVelle (1998) proposed a linear optimization model
to find the routes that minimize both the cost and the exact version of the prob-
ability of accident. The weighted sum technique is used to solve the biobjective
problem and to approximate the set of Pareto-optimal routes. The associated
weighted, single objective problem can thus be solved by simply applying the
classical shortest path algorithm. Tayi et al. (1999) dealt with the cost equity
and feasibility problem in hazmat routing, where each edge of the network is
associated with a vector of costs incurred by different zones due to an accident
along that edge. The zones represent the community clusters, and each com-
ponent of the cost vector represents the impact of an accident on a zone. The
notion of cost equity is represented by six objective functions, including mini-
mization of the average cost path, the maximum cost path, and the imbalanced
cost path.
As discussed earlier, many transport risk factors involve considerable un-
certainty, which increases the difficulty of routing decisions. Two methods
that are frequently used in incorporating uncertainty are mean-risk (e.g.,
Markowitz, 1987; Ogryczak and Ruszczynski, 2002) and stochastic dominance
(e.g., Yitzhaki, 1982; the survey by Levy, 1992). The mean-risk criterion is
based on comparing only two values: the mean, representing the expected
outcome; and the risk, a scalar measure of the variability of outcomes (e.g.,
variance and semivariance). Mean–variance (MV) criterion is probably the
most well-known mean-risk criterion. It states that if E(v(P1))  E(v(P2))
and Var(v(P1))  Var(v(P2)) with at least one strict inequality, then v(P1)
is MV-strictly smaller than v(P2), where v(P) is an evaluation function that
operates on path P .
Stochastic dominance (SD) criterion, on the other hand, considers the entire
probability distribution rather than just the two moments. It uses the cumula-
tive distribution function (CDF) as a basis for comparison. Let FP1 and FP2
be the CDFs of two random variables v(P1) and v(P2). The first- and second-
order stochastic dominance (FSD and SSD) are defined as follows. A random
variable v(P1) is strictly smaller, with respect to FSD, than a random variable
v(P2), if FP1(t)  FP2(t) for all values of t, and at least one of the inequalities
holds strictly. If two CDFs do not intersect, then one of them should stochasti-
cally dominate the other, regardless of their variances. Furthermore, a random
variable v(P1) is strictly smaller, with respect to SSD, than a random variable
v(P2), if
∫ t
−∞ (FP1(ω) − FP2(ω)) dω  0 for all values of t, and at least one the
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inequalities holds strictly. For SSD, the two CDFs may intersect, but the total
accumulated area between FP1 and FP2 must stay nonnegative up to any t. FSD
implies SSD but not vice versa.
Figure 17(a) shows that the distribution FP1 is above distribution FP2 every-
where, and therefore, the probability of “t or less” is higher under FP1 than FP2 .
In Figure 17(b), if the two distributions cross within the range of t, then the
FSD does not hold, but SSD holds. Figure 17(c) shows that v(P1) is nei-
ther FSD nor SSD smaller than v(P2) and vice versa. Mean–variance crite-
rion offers a much simpler computational tool than SD criterion. However,
a Pareto-optimal solution with respect to the MV criterion may be stochasti-
cally dominated by other feasible solutions if the normality of distributions is
not guaranteed (see, e.g., Yitzhaki, 1982; Ogryczak and Ruszczynski, 2002). On
the other hand, as the CDFs of v(P1) and v(P2) (or their integration) have to
be compared for every t, the stochastic dominance itself is actually a multiob-
jective model with a continuum of criteria. The stochastic dominance criterion
usually leads to large efficient sets, and it does not provide us with a simple
computational tool.
The problem with the efficient set becomes worse in the multiobjective rout-
ing problem, as the number of Pareto-optimal solutions can be exponential in
the number of nodes (Hansen, 1980). To reduce the size of this efficient set,
Fig. 17. (a) P1 is FSD P2; (b) P1 is not FSD P2 but P1 is SSD P2; (c) P1 is not SSD P2 and vice versa;
(d) P1 dominates P2 for q0  01382.
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Wijeratne et al. (1993) proposed a two-stage evaluation procedure for normally
distributed path evaluation functions. This procedure includes a probability pa-
rameter that allows the analyst or the decision maker to control the degree to
which a comparison deviates from the FSD criterion. That is, a path P1 domi-
nates P2 if either of the following occurs:
• Primary comparison rule: both the mean and the variance of v(P1) are
smaller than those of v(P2) (i.e., MV criterion).
• Secondary comparison rule: the mean of v(P1) is smaller, the variance
of v(P2) is smaller, and the CDF of v(P1) exceeds the CDF of v(P2)
for probability values greater than (1 − q0).
The higher the value of q0, the smaller the size of the efficient set. However,
a small set may exclude some interesting Pareto-optimal paths. Consider the
following small example. Suppose there are two paths P1 and P2 from an origin
to a destination, where the mean and standard deviation of v(P1) and v(P2) are
(176; 64) and (213; 30), respectively. Figure 17(d) shows that MV and FSD
criteria do not hold. By applying the criterion of Wijeratne et al. (1993), path
P1 will dominate P2 for q0 > 01382.
Although the example involves a single evaluation function v(P), observe
that the incorporation of uncertainty results in a multiobjective problem.
Wijeratne et al. (1993) proposed a simple procedure to deal with a stochastic
multiobjective routing problem (or with a mixture of deterministic and stochas-
tic path evaluation functions). We illustrate this procedure by a small example.
Suppose that there are two stochastic path evaluation functions v1(P), v2(P),
one deterministic path evaluation function v3(P) (all of these functions are to
be minimized) and 4 paths to be compared. Hence, the set of feasible paths is
P = {P1 P2 P3 P4}. The comparison is done separately for each evaluation
function, where the user-controlled probability parameter q0 may be different
for each stochastic evaluation function. Suppose we find (after applying the
two-stage evaluation procedure) that with respect to v1(P), the set P can be
partitioned into a ranked set P1 = {(P1) (P2 P3) P4}, which means P1 domi-
nates all other paths, P2 is indifferent to P3, and both P2 and P3 dominate P4.
Furthermore, with respect to v2(P), the set P may be partitioned into a ranked
set P2 = {(P1 P3) P4 P2}. Suppose that v3(P1) = 100, v3(P2) = 150,
v3(P3) = 50, and v3(P4) = 100, resulting in P3 = {P3 (P1 P4) P2}. We
can thus combine the relative ranking for each path to create a ranking vec-
tor of evaluation functions for each path: Path P1 : (1 1 2); Path P2 : (2 3 3);
Path P3 : (2 1 1); Path P4 : (3 2 2). (For the deterministic evaluation function,
one may put its value, instead of the relative ranking directly in the ranking
vector.) The final step is to examine this set of ranking vectors to eliminate
the dominated paths. If we require strict dominance across all evaluation func-
tions, we obtain two Pareto-optimal routes: P1 and P3.
Turnquist (1993) assumed that both accident probability and population
exposure are stochastic. He studied the problem of identifying a set of Pareto-
optimal routes with the following objectives: minimize the incident rate; min-
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imize the population exposed within a certain distance of the roadway; and
minimize the travel distance. Turnquist used the distribution functions of each
Pareto-optimal path on each criterion to highlight the trade-offs among the
Pareto-optimal solutions.
There are very few static and stochastic routing models (either single or
multiobjective) in the literature for hazmat transportation. In addition to
Wijeratne et al. (1993) and Turnquist (1993), the mean–variance models pro-
posed by Sivakumar and Batta (1994) and Erkut and Ingolfsson (2000) are
noteworthy (see the discussion on these papers in subsection “Mean–variance
model” of Section 3.3.2). There are static, stochastic path finding models
that are designed for other transportation applications (e.g., Frank, 1969;
Mirchandani, 1976; Kulkarni, 1986; Corea and Kulkarni, 1993), which the
reader may find useful. Nonetheless, the dynamic, stochastic routing is more
relevant to hazmat transportation, which we discuss in the next section.
4.3 Local routing and scheduling problems
The traffic conditions and other risk factors in hazmat transportation net-
works (e.g., incident probabilities and population exposure) often vary with
time and can at best be known a priori with uncertainty. For example, for
a hazmat truck, the travel time and the accident probability on certain road
segments can be uncertain and depend on traffic congestion, weather condi-
tions, and road conditions during the vehicle’s trip across those links. Hence,
the transport risk and arrival time at the destination can vary with the dispatch
schedule from the origin. Also, allowing the vehicle to stop during its trip in
order to avoid peak risk periods on certain road segments can be an effective
strategy to reduce the total transport risk (Erkut and Alp, 2006). To represent
this phenomenon appropriately, the transport network should be modeled as
a stochastic, time-varying (STV) network.
In an STV network, the link attributes (such as travel times, incident prob-
abilities, and population exposure) are represented as random variables with
a priori probability distributions that vary with time. STV network-based mod-
eling has been an important and well-researched topic since the late 1980s (see,
e.g., Hall, 1986; Fu and Rilett, 1998; Miller-Hooks and Mahmassani, 1998;
Miller-Hooks, 2001). Most of the existing results are devoted to the Intelligent
Transportation System (ITS), and only some of them are designed specifically
for the hazmat transportation problem (e.g., Bowler and Mahmassani, 1998;
Miller-Hooks and Mahmassani, 1998). The prevailing studies can be classified
into three different groups:
1. A priori optimization: the optimal routes are chosen before the travel be-
gins. Hence, an update on the routing decision en-route is not allowed.
2. Adaptive route selection: the routing decision is subject to change en-route
based on the realization of the estimated data.
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3. Adaptive route selection with real-time updates: the routing decision is
subject to change en-route due to real-time updates of the traffic data
followed by re-optimization procedures.
In the following, we will discuss some of the results in each class that can be
applied to hazmat transportation.
4.3.1 A priori optimization
This class of problems assumes that the optimal route is chosen before trip
begins. Hence, an update on the routing decision en-route is not allowed. All
routing decisions in static (time-invariant) networks fall into this category.
Hall (1986) showed that in STV networks, one cannot simply set the random
arc travel times to their expected values and identify the shortest (expected)
travel time by applying standard shortest path algorithms based on Bellman’s
equation (Bellman, 1958), such as Djikstra’s algorithm. The expected travel
time on an arc in STV networks depends on the arrival time of the vehicle at
the beginning of that arc. A partial route with a higher expected travel time
might be selected, if this choice results in a preferable outcome in the rest of
the route. This is demonstrated by the numerical example in Figure 18.
The objectives are to minimize the expected total travel time and to mini-
mize the expected total risk as defined by the expected total number of exposed
individuals. Suppose the hazmat truck must leave node O at 15:00. On the way
to node T , arc e1 has both, the lowest expected travel time, and the lowest ex-
pected population exposure (120 minutes and 100 individuals as opposed to
125 minutes and 120 individuals on arc e2). Hence, Bellman’s principle would
include arc e1 in the optimal path. However, note that a vehicle traveling on
Fig. 18. An STV network for the fastest and least risk path problem.
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arc e2 has a higher probability of arriving at node T before 16:45 (0.3 probabil-
ity as opposed to zero probability on arc e1). Hence, the total expected travel
time and the total expected population exposure via e2 are lower (03(90 +
60)+ 07(140 + 120) = 227 minutes and 03(120 + 50)+ 07(120 + 200) = 275
individuals as opposed to 240 minutes and 300 individuals).
Hall (1986) proposed an exact, nonpolynomial algorithm that combines a
branch-and-bound technique with a k-shortest paths algorithm to find the
fastest path in STV networks. This algorithm, however, applies only to acyclic
networks or to cyclic networks with First-In First-Out (FIFO) travel times. (We
say that travel times are FIFO if they are nondecreasing functions of time;
i.e., if Vehicle A leaves before Vehicle B, Vehicle A will arrive no later than
Vehicle B.) Miller-Hooks and Mahmassani (2000) extended Hall’s model to
allow cycles or non-FIFO travel times. They proposed a time-dependent label-
correcting algorithm to solve this fastest path problem. Under the assumption
that travel times are continuous functions of time, Fu and Rilett (1998) pro-
posed a heuristic algorithm based on the k-shortest path algorithm to solve
the fastest path problem without the FIFO assumption. The differentiating
feature of their model is the propagation of mean and variance of travel time
along a path in the process of determining the fastest path.
Chang et al. (2005) adapted the continuous-time mean and variance propa-
gation method of Fu and Rilett (1998) to discrete-time intervals and minimized
the total cost as well as the total travel time. The path evaluation functions
(except the total travel time) of two paths in STV networks are comparable
at a node only if the arrival times of those paths at this node are the same.
This condition, however, implies a large efficient set, as it may be unlikely that
two paths arrive at a node at precisely the same time. To tackle this prob-
lem, Sulijoadikusumo and Nozick (1998) and Chang et al. (2005) suggested
a time-window criterion: two paths are comparable only if their arrival times
are “close enough” as defined by the analyst/decision maker. Suppose YPji , the
arrival time at node i along a path Pj , is normally distributed. The probability
that the difference of two path travel times is less than or equal to a predefined
time window Δ can be approximated as
p
(∣∣YP1i − YP2i ∣∣  Δ) = 
(
Δ − (E[YP1i ] − E[YP2i ])√
Var[YP1i ] + Var[YP2i ]
)
− 
(−Δ − (E[YP1i ] − E[YP2i ])√
Var[YP1i ] + Var[YP2i ]
)

where (z) denotes the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal
random variable. If p(|YP1i − YP2i |  Δ)  δ, where δ is the pre-specified
threshold, then these two paths are comparable at node i. If the two paths are
comparable, then the stochastic comparison methods discussed in the previous
subsection can be used to choose the preferred path.
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4.3.2 Adaptive route selection
When traveling along a network, the motorist gathers new information that
can be useful in making better routing decisions. For example, the arrival time
at a node can be used in making a choice among the partial emanating from
that node. This is called adaptive route selection. The optimal route depends
on intermediate information concerning past travel times, road and weather
conditions and hence, a single (and simple) path is not adequate.
Hall (1986) showed that the optimal adaptive route in STV networks that
minimizes the expected travel time is not a simple path but an acyclic subnet-
work (called a hyperpath) that represents a set of routing strategies (see, e.g.,
Nguyen and Pallottino, 1986). The adaptive route specifies the road link to be
chosen at each intermediate node, as a function of the arrival time at the node.
As an illustration, consider the example depicted in Figure 19.
The hazmat truck is to leave node O at 15:00. The a priori expected travel
times of two paths P1 := {e1 e2} and P2 := {e1 e3} are 03(90+60)+07(140+
120) = 227 minutes and 03(90 + 100) + 07(140 + 30) = 176 minutes,
respectively. The associated a priori expected total risks for P1 and P2 are
03(100+100)+07(150+80) = 221 and 03(100+200)+07(150+50) = 230
individuals at risk, respectively. Hence, the a priori fastest path is path P2, and
the a priori least risk path is P1. However, if the motorist is permitted to select
the rest of the path upon arrival at node T , we will obtain the following routing
strategy:
• Travel time: If the arrival time at node T is 16:30, take arc e2 with
a travel time of 60 minutes. If the arrival time at node T is 17:20, take
arc e3 with a travel time of 30 minutes. The expected travel time for the
adaptive fastest path from O to D is 03(90+60)+07(140+30) = 164
minutes. The associated total risk is 03(100 + 100) + 07(150 + 50) =
200 individuals at risk.
• Total risk: The routing strategy is the same as for that of the adaptive
fastest path.
The resulting hyperpath of the optimal adaptive routing strategy, depicted as
a decision tree, is shown in Figure 20.
It is, in general, quite unlikely that the optimal adaptive routing strategies of
different objectives coincide. In this case, the multiobjective version of the la-
bel correcting and Stochastic Decreasing Order of Time (SDOT) algorithms
from Miller-Hooks (2001) can be used to generate a set of Pareto-optimal
adaptive routing strategies.
4.3.3 Adaptive route selection with real-time updates
The recent advances in information and communication technologies, such
as satellite-based Automatic Vehicle Location (AVL) and mobile phones, en-
able the driver and dispatch center to obtain and exchange real-time infor-
mation. Satellite-based AVL is a computer-based vehicle tracking system that
uses signals from satellite systems, such as Navstar Global Positioning System
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Fig. 19. An STV network for the adaptive routing strategy.
Fig. 20. The resulting hyperpath of the adaptive routing strategy, depicted as a decision tree.
(GPS), to identify a vehicle’s location. Mobile communication systems such as
cellular phones, paging systems, and mobile satellite communication systems,
provide two-way communication between the driver and the dispatch center
or among drivers. These AVL and mobile communication systems enable the
driver and the dispatch center to monitor and/or change the route of vehicles
based on real-time information.
These technological advances are challenging OR researchers to develop
routing models and robust optimization procedures that are able to respond
quickly to changes in the data. In this real-time environment, the quality of the
decision depends not only on the appropriateness of the decision, but also on
its timeliness (Seguin et al., 1997). Another main issue in this area, besides
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route planning, is the data updating procedure. New real-time information
obtained by the dispatch center is used to update the estimation of future val-
ues of some network attributes (e.g., travel times, incident probabilities, and
population in the impact area). However, this information is of limited use
if the information is about parts of the transport network that are far away
from the current location of the vehicle (either spatially or temporally). There-
fore, either a spatial or a temporal discounting procedure must be applied
before this real-time information is used to update the estimates of network
attributes (see, e.g., Hoffman and Janko, 1990; Koutsopoulos and Xu, 1993;
Yang, 2001).
We observe a lack of papers in this area that consider both adaptive routing
decisions and data updates based on real-time information. Moreover, none
of the prevailing studies are designed specifically for hazmat transportation
problems. Koutsopoulos and Xu (1993) proposed an information discounting
procedure for travel times in finding the shortest path in STV networks with
an FIFO assumption. For temporal discounting, they used the results from
Hoffman and Janko (1990), where the ratio of the historical mean over its
current travel time is used to estimate the future travel times on the same arc.
Suppose that the route planning is defined in discrete time T := {tk :k =
0    K} with tk+1 := tk + Δ, k = 0    K − 1. If we denote the travel time




where λ̄ijt is the historical average travel time on (i j) at time t and λijt is
the associated actual travel time. This ratio is set to 1.0 when real-time infor-
mation for an arc is not available. To incorporate changes in neighboring arcs,







where Aij is a set of all adjacent arcs of (i j). The new estimated travel time
λ′ijt′ on arc (i j) at a future time period t





Koutsopoulos and Xu (1993) claimed that actual information obtained on arc
(i j) will be less useful, as either the distance between the origin node and
node i increases or the variability of the historical travel time on (i j) in-
creases. The new estimation of travel time (after being temporally and spatially
discounted) on arc (i j) is
λ∗ijt0+Psi(t0) = λ̄ijt′′ + e−θσijt′′Psi(t0)(λ′ijt′′ − λ̄ijt′′)
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where Psi(t0) is the shortest travel time from the origin node s to node i de-
parting from the origin at time t0, θ is a positive constant scalar that can be
adjusted to produce a good fit between the estimated and actual travel times,
t ′′−  t0 +Pij(t0)  t ′′, and σijt′′ is the standard deviation of historical travel
time λ̄ijt′′ . The larger the value of Psi(t0) and σijt′′ , the larger the discounting
of the actual information. This travel time updating procedure is incorporated
in the label setting algorithm to find the shortest routes from an origin s. For
each arc (i j) out of the last permanently labeled node i, calculate (if node j is
not yet permanently labeled):
Psj(t0) = min
{
Psj(t0) Psi(t0) + λ̄ijt′′
+ e−θσijt′′Psi(t0)(λ′ijt′′ − λ̄ijt′′)
}

Set the label of a node with the smallest Psj(t0) to permanent and update its
predecessor node, which is needed to construct a path from the origin. The
process is repeated until all nodes are labeled permanently.
Yang (2001) discussed an adaptive route selection with real-time updates in
discrete STV networks, which is applied to ITS. To update the travel times,
Yang considered both spatial and temporal information discounting, which
are determined by spatial and temporal depth. The spatial depth determines
the maximum reachable distance, with respect to the number of arcs, from
the current node. The temporal depth is defined as the maximum number
of time periods in which the information is still considered valuable. Fur-
thermore, Yang also proposed two re-optimization algorithms to find the new
adaptive route strategy that incorporates the new estimated travel times. The
re-optimization algorithms are based on the ELB (Expected Lower Bound) al-
gorithm of Miller-Hooks and Mahmassani (2000) and the SDOT algorithm of
Miller-Hooks (2001). These re-optimization algorithms, called “adapted ELB”
and “adapted SDOT,” assume that the realization of the travel time must coin-
cide with one of the possible values known a priori. Hence, it is assumed that
the analysts are able to predict all possible values of future travel times, which
is not realistic in many cases.
4.4 Global routing problems
The global route planning problem typically belongs to a government agency
charged with the management of hazmat shipments within and through its ju-
risdiction. Although the transportation industry has been deregulated in many
countries, hazmat transportation usually remains as part of the governments’
mandate mainly due to the associated public and environmental risks. The two
main concerns for a government agency are the total risk and the spatial distri-
bution of risk in its jurisdiction. A number of policy tools are available to the
government in mitigating public risk. These include proactive measures such
as the establishment of inspection stations (Gendreau et al., 2000), insurance
requirements (Verter and Erkut, 1997), and container specifications (Barkan
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et al., 2000) as well as reactive measures such as the establishment of haz-
mat emergency response networks (Berman et al., 2007). Another common
tool for governments is to ban the use of certain road segments by potentially
hazardous vehicles. For an example of such regulation, we refer the reader
to the local authority bylaws section of the Alberta Dangerous Goods Trans-
portation and Handling Act (Government of Alberta, 2002). In the context of
global route planning, the road segments to be closed by the government can
be identified by solving a hazmat network design problem, which we discuss in
Section 4.4.2.
Equity in the spatial distribution of risk can be important for a government
agency for two reasons: (i) the perception of risk inequity frequently results
in public opposition to the routing of vehicles carrying hazmats through the
nearby passageways; and (ii) the overloading of certain road segments with
hazmat flows (i.e., risk inequity) may lead to an increase in the incident proba-
bilities as well as the severity of consequences. The concept of equity has been
studied in the OR literature primarily within the context of undesirable facility
location. Marsh and Schilling (1994) provided a comprehensive review of eq-
uity measures for location problems. Erkut (1993) offered two equity axioms
for location problems and showed that the Gini coefficient and the coefficient
of variation are the only measures that satisfy both of these axioms. Defining
n = number of zones, ti = individual risk at population zone i, and t̄ = average
individual risk, these two equity measures can be represented as follows:
Coefficient of variation =
√∑







i |ti − tj|
2n2 t̄

Coefficient of variation evaluates equity in terms of the deviations of the in-
dividual risks from the average. In contrast, Gini coefficient focuses on the
differences between individual risks. Clearly, smaller values of these equity
measures correspond to higher levels of fairness in risk distribution. A value
of zero represents perfect equity, whereas a value of one represents absolute
inequality. Using GIS, Verter and Kara (2001) estimated these two equity
measures for gasoline shipments in Ontario and Quebec under four routing
criterion: minimum length, minimum expected risk, minimum population ex-
posure, and minimum incident probability.
4.4.1 Equity considerations in global route planning
The multiobjective model proposed by Zografos and Davis (1989) was per-
haps the first attempt to explicitly incorporate equity considerations in global
route planning for dangerous goods shipments. Their objectives were to min-
imize the total risk, the risk imposed on special population categories, travel
time, and property damage. Equity is achieved by constraining the capacity
of the road links. Zografos and Davis used pre-emptive goal programming in
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solving the problem, and demonstrated (using hypothetical data) that forcing
equity could increase the total risk up to 35%.
Gopalan et al. (1990a) proposed an equity constrained shortest path model
that minimizes the total risk of travel between and origin–destination pair,
while maintaining a desired level of equity among disjoint zones of a trans-
portation network. Each zone constitutes a jurisdiction of a government agency
that regulates hazmat transportation. The travel risk associated with road
link (i j) is the sum of risks imposed on the zones in the vicinity of the link. An
origin–destination path is considered equitable if the difference between the
risks imposed on any two arbitrary zones is under a given threshold. This eq-
uitable path definition can be incorporated in the shortest path model through
additional constraints. Gopalan et al. (1990b) developed a subgradient algo-
rithm to solve the Lagrangian dual, which is obtained by relaxing the equity
constraints. They proposed a labeling shortest path procedure to close any
remaining duality gap. The model was applied to a 50-node network from Al-
bany, New York.
Gopalan et al. (1990b) extended their earlier work so as to identify a set of
routes to be utilized for T trips between a single and origin–destination pair. In
this case the equity threshold for a zone pair is the sum of the risk differences
over T trips. Note that the T routes do not need to be distinct in their model.
Gopalan et al. (1990b) proposed a heuristic procedure that repeatedly solves
single trip problems using a Lagrangian dual approach with the gap-closing
procedure, as in Gopalan et al. (1990a). To avoid having T identical routes,
the link risks are modified using information from the previous t routes during
iteration (t + 1). This iterative procedure can easily be adapted to multiple
origin–destination pairs.
In extending Gopalan et al. (1990b), Lindner-Dutton et al. (1991) focused
on finding an equitable sequence of T trips, where the cumulative risk in-
curred by any zone after t < T trips is equitable to that incurred by the other
zones in the previous t trips. Both integer programming and dynamic program-
ming (DP) formulations of this problem were presented. Lindner-Dutton et al.
(1991) showed that a DP approach combined with the relaxation and fathom-
ing methods of the Branch and Bound algorithm (as described in Morin and
Marsten, 1976) could not solve moderate size problems to optimality within
reasonable time. Therefore, they developed five upper bound heuristics to
tackle large problems.
Marianov and ReVelle (1998) proposed a linear optimization model to solve
the global route planning problem that minimizes both total cost and (the exact
version of) accident probability. To introduce equity, they used an upper bound
on the total risk associated with each arc. Similarly, Iakovou et al. (1999) in-
corporated equity through the use of a capacitated transport network model.
Their multicommodity network flow model has two objectives: minimize trans-
port cost and minimize expected risk cost. They used a weighted sum of these
costs in conducting a trade-off analysis. A two-phase solution procedure, simi-
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lar to that of Gopalan et al. (1990a), was proposed. The model was applied to
marine transportation of oil products in the Gulf of Mexico.
The studies on generation of a set of spatially dissimilar (not necessarily
disjoint) paths are also relevant to equity considerations in global route plan-
ning (e.g., Akgün et al., 2000; Dell’Olmo et al., 2005). Iterative penalty method
(IPM), gateway shortest paths method, and minimax method are among the
procedures that can be used to generate such a set of paths set between an
origin–destination pair. However, Akgün et al. (2000) showed that the gate-
way shortest path method may not be suitable for generating dissimilar paths.
They posed the dissimilarity problem as a p-dispersion problem (Erkut, 1990).
In the p-dispersion context, p of m candidate paths are selected so that the
minimum spatial dissimilarity between any pair of selected paths is maximized.
The m candidate paths can be constructed using k-shortest path method or
IPM.
Erkut and Verter (1998) proposed four indexes to measure the dissimilarity
among paths P1 and P2:
• Arithmetic average of two ratios:
1 − L(P1 ∩ P2)
2L(P1)
+ L(P1 ∩ P2)
2L(P2)
;






• Ratio of the intersection length and the length of the longest path:
1 − L(P1 ∩ P2)
max{L(P1) L(P2)} ;
• Ratio of the intersection length and the length of the union of the two
paths:
1 − L(P1 ∩ P2)
L(P1 ∪ P2) ;
where L(P) denotes the length of path P .
Dell’Olmo et al. (2005) provided a multicriteria formulation of the dis-
similar path problem. They used travel distance and transport risk as their
criteria. After finding the Pareto-optimal set of paths, a buffer zone is con-
structed for each path in this set. This buffer zone approximates the impact
area of a hazmat incident. Based on the buffer zones, a dissimilarity index can
be calculated for each pair of paths by replacing L(P) in the above defini-
tions with A(P) that represents the area of the buffer zone around path P.
For example, the average arithmetic dissimilarity index can be defined as
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1 −A(P1 ∩ P2)/(2A(P1))+A(P1 ∩ P2)/(2A(P2)). A subset of maximally dis-
similar paths (spatially speaking) can thus be found, for example, by applying
the p-dispersion method.
The above models can be useful in identifying a global routing plan for a ma-
jor hazmat producer/carrier that takes into account the equitable distribution
of transport risk in a region. However, these models are of little use in the im-
plementation of a comprehensive global transportation plan in a jurisdiction
with multiple carriers since governments have no authority to impose routes
on individual carriers. Yet many governments have the authority to close cer-
tain road segments to hazmat shipments (permanently or during certain hours
of the day), and equity concerns can be incorporated into a hazmat network
design problem. This is an interesting and challenging OR problem that has
not been studied in the past. In the next section we review a closely related
problem: the hazmat network design problem with a risk minimization objec-
tive.
4.4.2 Hazmat transportation network design
Network design problems have wide applications in both transporta-
tion and telecommunication planning (see, e.g., Magnanti and Wong, 1984;
Balakrishnan et al., 1997). It is important to recognize the differentiating char-
acteristics of this problem in the context of dangerous goods shipments. The
transportation infrastructure is built mainly to connect heavily populated areas
and not to avoid them. Therefore, the question becomes which road segments
to close in an existing network rather than identifying the most appropriate
ways to expand the infrastructure. Kara and Verter (2004) provide the follow-
ing definition: given an existing road network, the hazardous network design
problem involves selecting the road segments that should be closed to haz-
mat transport so as to minimize total risk. The carriers will select minimum
cost routes on the designated hazmat network, and they are likely to incur
higher costs due to reduced availability of routes. Hence, this can be consid-
ered a two-level decision problem where the government designates a subset
of the transport network for hazmat transport and carriers select routes on this
subset.
Note that these two levels cannot be considered in isolation. If one were to
select minimum risk routes and offer the union of such routes to the carriers,
the carriers would select minimum cost routes on this network which could
result in much higher risk levels than the government had intended. This can
be illustrated using the example depicted in Figure 21(a) (Erkut and Gzara,
2005). Suppose that hazmat type 1 is to be sent from node 1 to node 8, and
hazmat type 2 is to be sent from node 2 to node 8. Assume that the transport
cost for each commodity is the same.
If the carrier is allowed to route freely, it will select the minimum cost
routes {(1 3) (3 8)} and {(2 5) (5 6) (6 8)} with a total cost of 3 + 3 = 6
units and total risk of 8 + 8 = 16 units. In contrast the minimum risk routes
are {(1 3) (3 6) (6 8)} and {(2 5) (5 6) (6 7) (7 8)} with a total risk of
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(a) (b)
Fig. 21. (a) Multicommodity hazmat transport network design problem; (b) The feasible roads for
routing cost minimization.
7 + 4 = 11 units. Figure 21(b) shows the union of the two minimum risk
paths. If the government designates this network as the hazmat transport net-
work, but allows the carrier to choose its routes, it will select the minimum
cost routes {(1 3) (3 6) (6 8)} and {(2 5) (5 6) (6 8)} with a total cost of
8 units and total risk of 13 units. This risk is higher than what the government
anticipates. As this example demonstrates, the design problem cannot be sim-
plified to a one-level risk minimization problem, and the government must take
into account the cost-minimizing behavior of carriers in designing the network.
The hazmat transportation network design problem has received the atten-
tion of researchers only recently. Kara and Verter (2004) proposed a bi-level
integer linear programming formulation for this design problem that involves
multiple types of hazmats. Their aim is to design a transport network so that
the total risk resulting from the carriers’ route choices is minimized. At the
outer-level, risk is measured as the total number of people exposed to hazmat
transport incidents. The inner-level problem represents the carriers’ routing
decisions on the available transport network so as to minimize their cost. This
problem is represented by the linearized Karush–Kuhn–Tucker (KKT) condi-
tions of its LP relaxation. As a result, the bi-level integer programming (IP)
problem is transformed into a single-level mixed integer programming prob-
lem. The proposed model is solved by using CPLEX and applied to the hazmat
transport network in Western Ontario, Canada. Kara and Verter demonstrate
that carriers can benefit from the government’s efforts and involvement in the
regulation of dangerous goods shipments.
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Erkut and Gzara (2005) considered a bi-level bi-objective (cost and risk
minimization) network design problem similar to that discussed by Kara and
Verter (2004). They proposed a heuristic algorithm that exploits the network
flow structure at both levels, instead of transforming the bi-level IP problem to
a single-level formulation. As a result, they achieved a significant increase in
the computational performance.
Erkut and Alp (2007) posed the minimum risk hazmat network design prob-
lem as a Steiner tree selection problem. This topology takes away the carriers’
freedom in route selection and simplifies the bi-level problem to a single level.
However, it also results in circuitous (and expensive) routes. To avoid an eco-
nomically infeasible solution, they suggested adding edges to the Steiner tree.
They proposed a greedy heuristic that adds shortest paths to the tree so as to
keep the risk increase to a minimum. They also posed a bi-objective version of
the problem to minimize cost and risk, and solved it using a weighted additive
objective. Their approach allows the decision maker to determine the density
of the hazmat network where the options range from a tree to a completely
connected network.
Verter and Kara (2005) provided a path-based formulation for the haz-
ardous network design problem. Their main modeling construct is a set of al-
ternative paths for each shipment. This facilitates the incorporation of carriers’
cost concerns in regulator’s risk reduction decisions. Paths not economically
viable for carriers can be left out of the model. Alternative solutions to the
network design problem can be generated by varying the number of routing
options included in the model. To this end, Verter and Kara use pre-specified
thresholds, e.g., for the maximum acceptable additional travel distance com-
pared to the shortest path. Therefore, each solution corresponds to a certain
compromise between the regulator and the carriers in terms of the associated
transport risks and costs. Information about the nature of the cost-risk trade
off can facilitate negotiation between the two parties. By using a GIS-based
model of Quebec and Ontario, the authors demonstrate that their path-based
formulation can be used for identifying road closure decisions that are mutu-
ally acceptable.
5 Facility location and transportation
Hazmat shipments often originate from facilities that themselves are poten-
tially harmful to public and environmental safety, such as petroleum refineries
or nuclear power plants. Also, the destinations of hazmat shipments can be
noxious facilities such as gas stations and hazardous waste treatment centers.
The location decisions pertaining to such facilities have a considerable effect
on the routing of hazmat shipments. Therefore, integration of facility loca-
tion and routing decisions can be an effective means to mitigate the total risk
in a region where hazmats are processed and transported. It is interesting to
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note that, in general, location decisions are considered strategic, whereas rout-
ing decisions are dealt with at the tactical level. However, the risk constitutes
a coupling factor for these decisions in the context of dangerous goods. We
refer the reader to Erkut and Neuman (1989) and Cappanera (1999) for exten-
sive surveys of the location-only literature dealing with undesirable facilities.
In this section, we provide a review of the prevailing studies on integrated lo-
cation and routing models for hazmats.
The location–routing problem (LRP) involves determining the optimal num-
ber, capacity, and location of facilities as well as the associated optimal set of
routes (and shipping schedules) to be used in serving customers. The distribu-
tion of goods from the facilities to the customers can be on a full-truck load or
less than full-truck load basis. In the latter case, routes involving multiple cus-
tomers are commonly used. From the solution method perspective, the LRP is
NP-hard and offers a variety of challenges to OR researchers. The literature
addressing LRP with different real-world applications has evolved since the
late 1960s. Christofides and Elon (1969) were among the first to consider LRP
with multiple customers on each route. The literature surveys on LRP include
Madsen (1983), Balakrishnan et al. (1997), and Min et al. (1998).
Two types of risk need to be taken into account in integrating location and
routing decisions pertaining to hazmat shipments: transport risk, RT, and facil-
ity risk, RF. Figure 22 illustrates these two types of risk. An individual at point x
is exposed to (i) a transport incident on a nearby route segment l of a path P
that involves a vehicle carrying volume vP and (ii) an incident at the hazmat
treatment center at site j with capacity uj . The transport risk, RTPl(vP x), can
be determined as a function of the undesirable consequence at point x, taking
into account the impact zone of a hazmat incident on segment l (see Section 3),
and the estimated incident probability. The facility risk, RFj (uj x), can be de-
termined in a similar way, with site j replacing the route segment l. Let O and D
denote sets of origins and destinations, respectively, POD denote the set of all
utilized paths for each O–D pair (O ∈ O and D ∈ D), and L denote the set
of hazmat facility locations. Assuming additivity of risk, the individual risk at












Let A denote the region of interest and POP(x) denote the population density





Now consider a location–routing problem where L = D (e.g., storage loca-
tions for spent nuclear fuel shipments). Let VO denote the hazmat volume at
O ∈ O (e.g., a nuclear power plant) that needs to be transported, and let uD
denote the capacity of a hazmat treatment facility at site D ∈ D. Note that
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Fig. 22. Individual risk at point x due to transportation and processing of dangerous goods (adapted
from List and Mirchandani, 1991).
D and POD now represent the sets of candidate locations for hazmat treatment
facilities and the set of potential paths for each origin–destination pair, respec-
tively. The set POD may represent the set of available routes on the hazmat
road network designated by the government (see Section 4.4.2). We define two
types of variables:




0 if a new hazmat treatment facility is located
in site D
1 otherwise
• nonnegative continuous flow variables vP representing the quantity of
hazmat shipped along path P .
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In addition to the total risk, the costs (i.e., transportation, operation, and
fixed costs) should be also minimized. Let cTP denote the transportation cost per
unit volume of hazmat along path P , cFD denote the (annualized) installation
cost and cOD denote the unit operation cost of a hazmat treatment facility at


















Also, equity in the spatial distribution of risk due to the location and routing
decisions can be a relevant objective. Risk equity can be enforced, for example,




Hence, a mathematical programming formulation of the capacitated LRP





























RFD(uD x)yD for all x ∈ A
(5.7)yD ∈ {0 1} for all D ∈ D
vP  0 for all P ∈ POD and O–D pairs
(5.8)O ∈ OD ∈ D
Constraints (5.4) ensure that all hazmat generated must be shipped out of the
origins, whereas constraints (5.5) stipulate that if a facility at location D is open
(i.e., yD = 1), then total quantity of hazmat to be treated at D cannot exceed
the pre-specified capacity of the facility. Constraints (5.6) are used to incorpo-
rate the risk equity. It is evident from the above model that the hazmat LRP is
multiobjective by nature. The surveys by List et al. (1991), Boffey and Karkazis
(1993), and Cappanera et al. (2004) observed that literature on hazmat LRP is
Ch. 9. Hazardous Materials Transportation 603
sparse. In this section, rather than duplicating these surveys, we highlight the
important results.
Shobrys (1981) is the first study on hazmat LRP with a focus on selecting
routes and storage locations for spent nuclear fuel shipments. A decomposition
approach is used to separate the routing problem from the location problem.
Two routing objectives are minimized; ton-miles and population exposure-
tons. The associated bi-objective shortest path model identifies a set of Pareto-
optimal paths between each waste source (origin) and each candidate storage
site (destination). The weighted costs associated with each Pareto-optimal path
determine the cost coefficients of the p-median problem that is used to select
the storage site.
Zografos and Samara (1989) considered an LRP with three objectives,
namely minimization of transport risk, minimization of travel times, and min-
imization of disposal risk, to establish locations of a given number of waste
treatment facilities and determine the associated shipment routes. Their model
requires that the hazardous waste at each population center must be disposed
of entirely. Each population center is assigned to its nearest disposal facility.
Moreover, links of the transportation network are capacitated. Pre-emptive
goal programming is used to generate solutions under a few different scenar-
ios.
List and Mirchandani (1991) proposed a hazmat LRP model that simulta-
neously considers total transportation and treatment risk, total transportation
cost, and risk equity. Risk equity is enforced by minimizing the maximum con-
sequence per unit population for all mutually disjoint zones of the transporta-
tion network. Their formulation served as a basis for the model in (5.1)–(5.8).
However, the List and Mirchandani model is more general since it allows for
different types of hazardous materials and treatment technologies. This model
assumes that the impact to point x in a zone Z from a vehicle incident is
inversely proportional to the square of the Euclidean distance between the
vehicle and point x, and the impact is directly proportional to the volume vP
being shipped regardless of material. Hence, the transport risk faced by an
individual at point x is determined as
RTPl(vP x) := αvP
∫
l∈P
‖l − x‖−2c(x)π(l) dl
where α is a constant of proportionality, c(x) is a likelihood of impact at
point x, and π(l) is the probability of an incident at road segment l. The fa-
cility risk from an incident at a hazardous waste treatment facility at site j of
waste type w with treatment technology t and volume ujwt , RFjwt(ujwt x), is
determined in a similar way. However, their facilities have unlimited capacity
and the total cost of establishing treatment facilities is bounded by a budget
constraint. Uncertainty is considered in constructing the risk formulations, but
it is not incorporated in solving the example case. Instead, the expected num-
ber of fatalities is used to calculate the risk. The LRP problem is solved using
LINDO. The weighted sum technique is used to study the tradeoffs among
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the objectives in identifying the transportation routes, locating the hazardous
waste treatment facilities, and choosing the treatment technologies.
ReVelle et al. (1991) developed a combined discrete location–routing model
for shipments of spent nuclear fuel that minimizes both transportation cost
and perceived risk. As in Shobrys (1981), the transportation cost is measured
in ton-miles, and the perceived risk is measured using population exposure as
people-tons. The total people-ton of an arc is the product of the number of
people within a certain bandwidth on the arc and the tons of hazardous waste
shipped on that arc. The problem is solved in two stages. In the first stage,
a weighted sum of the arc distance and the number of people in the impact
area around that arc (called hybrid distance) is calculated for every arc in the
network. Floyd’s shortest path algorithm is used to generate (hybrid) shortest
paths for all origin–destination pairs. In the second stage, the location prob-
lem is modeled as a p-median problem, where the coefficients of the objective
function are calculated by taking the product of the tons of spent fuel at the
origin and the hybrid shortest distance from the origin to the destination.
Stowers and Palekar (1993) proposed a bi-objective network LRP with a sin-
gle facility and a single commodity. In a network LRP, the waste facility can
be located anywhere on the network. Two objectives are considered, namely
minimizing the total exposure (minisum) and minimizing the maximum expo-
sure (minimax). The total exposure to a node or to an arc of the network is
represented as a convex combination of location exposure and travel expo-
sure, where the impact area is modeled as a danger circle. Stowers and Palekar
showed that an optimal solution to the minisum and minimax problems with
only travel exposure occurs at a node. The nodal optimality is still valid for
any positive linear combination of travel cost and travel exposure as long as
the travel cost is an increasing function of distance, as in ReVelle et al. (1991).
Moreover, when population is concentrated at nodes only, a finite dominat-
ing set of facility locations can be identified which is guaranteed to contain an
optimal solution.
Giannikos (1998) proposed a multiobjective model for a discrete hazardous
waste LRP that minimizes the following four objectives:
(1) total transportation cost and fixed cost of opening the treatment facili-
ties;
(2) total perceived risk due to the shipment of hazardous waste;
(3) maximum individual risk (to force the risk equity); and
(4) maximum individual disutility due to the treatment facilities.
The disutility imposed on a population center i by the establishment of a treat-
ment facility at site j is a function of the capacity of facility j and the distance
between i and j. The total disutility at population center i is obtained by adding
the disutilities imposed upon i by all treatment facilities. A weighted goal pro-
gramming technique is used to solve the problem.
Cappanera et al. (2004) presented a single objective LRP model that mini-
mizes the total transportation and facility establishment costs. In their model,
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an arc formulation is given instead of a path formulation as in (5.1)–(5.8). Their
model includes constraints that require both routing and population exposures
for each affected site to remain within given threshold values. Arcs of the
network are incapacitated, but the facilities are capacitated. Cappanera et al.
(2004) consider only a single commodity and seek to find the optimal number
of facilities. By dualizing the capacity constraints, the LRP is decomposed into
location and routing subproblems to obtain a lower bound. To find the upper
bounds, two Lagrangian heuristics, called the Location–Routing heuristic and
Routing–Location heuristic, are proposed.
In closing this section, we note that almost all existing models for hazmat
LRP are static and deterministic. Only the model of List and Mirchandani
(1991) considers different types of hazmats and technology selection for haz-
mat treatment facilities as well as uncertainty in problem parameters. The lack
of multiple hazmat models that consider stochasticity in a time-dependent en-
vironment constitutes an area for further LRP research.
6 Synthesis and future research directions
To summarize the material we have reviewed, Tables 2(a–d) groups the mod-
els into classes distinguished by
• the main aspects of the problem (risk assessment, routing, combined
facility location and routing, and network design),
• transport mode,
• single vs. multiple objectives,
• whether or not stochastic elements are included,
• whether or not time-variant elements are included,
• whether or not GIS is used.
Tables 2(a–d) suggests that the hazmat transportation problems on highways
received the most attention from the operations researchers. In contrast, haz-
mat transportation via air or pipeline, as well as intermodal hazmat transporta-
tion has received almost no attention. From the methodological perspectives,
we observe that:
• global routing problems on stochastic time-varying networks received
no attention despite their relevance and application potential,
• hazmat transportation network design problem which considers all in-
volved parties (government and the carriers) is a relatively young re-
search topic. The most obvious extension of the existing models in this
area is to incorporate uncertainty and consider multiple objectives as
the hazmat transportation problems are highly stochastic in nature and
involve multiple criteria (and players),
• there is an increase on utilizing a GIS either for data input or combined
with optimization models to conduct more realistic risk assessment.
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Erkut and Verter (1995a) reflected on the state-of-the-art as of 1995, and
pointed out a number of directions for future research. In the following ten
years, some of the problem areas proposed in Erkut and Verter (1995a) were
investigated by researchers, whereas many others remained relatively unex-
plored. We discuss some of the underexploited areas discussed in Erkut and
Verter (1995a), as well as other potential problem areas, that can lead to fruit-
ful research.
Risk calculation – probabilities
QRA relies heavily on empirical accident/incident probabilities. However
past data is not very reliable. Using general truck accident data for hazmat
trucks overestimates the accident probabilities. What makes matters worse is
that there is no agreement on general truck accident probabilities and con-
flicting numbers are reported by different researchers. Furthermore, applying
national data uniformly on all road segments of similar type is quite problem-
atic since it ignores hot spots such as road intersections, highway ramps, and
bridges. Researchers need to have access to high quality accident probability
data and empirical or theoretical research that leads to improvements in the
quality of such data would be welcome.
Risk calculation – perceived risks
Given the limitation of QRA, and the fact that public opposition is a func-
tion of perceived risks, perhaps more attention should be paid to quantifying
and modeling of perceived risks. We believe more work is needed to improve
our understanding of how perceived risks change as a function of the haz-
ardous substance, the distance to a hazardous activity, and the volume of the
activity.
Risk calculation – consequences
The second important input in QRA is the population exposed as a result of
an incident. Many past studies used uniform population density along transport
links which is a very blunt approach. A GIS makes it possible to use more pre-
cise population information. However, using census-based population data for
daytime hazmat movements makes little sense since census data is residence-
based and most residents are not at home during the day. Researchers need to
take the next step and incorporate day versus night population distributions,
as well as high-density population installations such as schools and hospitals.
While this is done relatively easily for QRA of a single route, it is more com-
plicated to generate the necessary data for an entire transportation network.
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Risk calculation – time dependence
There are very significant differences in risks between day and night (due
to differences in accident probabilities, population distributions, and weather
conditions). Yet most of the OR literature pays little attention to this. Risk
radii (or safe distances) strongly depend on transport mode and weather condi-
tions. Hence, it is impossible to speak of a single “minimum risk” route; hazmat
routing problems must be solved with real-time information. Solving problems
with static parameter values can result in poor solutions and decisions.
Risk calculation – model
We emphasized the importance of using the proper risk model throughout
the chapter. It is important to use as accurate a model as technically and com-
putationally feasible. For example, it is not only possible, but also necessary
to combine GIS data, plume dispersion modeling, and real-time weather in-
formation to determine bypass routes for chlorine shipments. In fact, analysis
that does not use such level of detail is of little use in the case of hazmats that
can generate plumes.
Risk calculation – nonhuman risks
The vast portion of the hazmat risk literature is concerned with fatalities,
and to some extent injuries and property damage. Little if any attention is paid
to environmental damage. Environmental risks are usually only included in
multiattribute utility models. We believe that hazmat risk models should take
into account all risks to humans and environment for broader acceptance by
the public.
Multicriteria approach to risk minimization
It is well known that different routes can emerge as minimum risk routes
depending on the definition of risk used. Hence, it is crucial to use multiple
measures and provide decision-makers with a set of efficient solutions instead
of a single “risk minimizing” route. Development of methodology that would
allow for the decision-makers to effectively search the efficient solution set and
select a route would be of great practical use.
Risk equity
The academic literature suggests that equity in the spatial distribution of risk
is a critical concern in designing hazmat management strategies acceptable to
the public. Yet, risk equity is not a great concern to the hazmat industry. If
equity is a valid concern then it must be imposed by a regulatory agency.
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Local vs. global route planning
Most hazmat transport models deal with only one commodity. While it may
make sense for carriers to decompose a transport planning problem into mul-
tiple single commodity problems, if one is concerned about concentration and
distribution of risks, one has to pose a multicommodity problem where risk
and equity concerns couple the different materials. For example, hazmat facil-
ity location models should include the hazmat distribution network for proper
risk assessment. Likewise, the hazmat network design problem requires con-
sideration of all hazmats.
Multidisciplinary nature of the problem
It is rather unfortunate that research in this highly multidisciplinary area
continues to be compartmentalized. Chemical and civil engineers tend to pub-
lish in their own journals, decision analysts and quantitative risk assessment
researchers limit their focus to their paradigms, and operations researchers
seldom wonder outside their safe zone. For fruitful research and applications
researchers from different disciplines have to reach out to one another.
Cost consequences of risks
One of the reasons why hazmat carriers are not too interested in hazmat
routing research is that there are no consequences to not using a decision-
support system before making routing decisions. If carriers are faced with
lawsuits as a result of poor routing decisions, or if their insurance companies
(or creditors) required the use of QRA in route planning to avoid such law-
suits, or if a government agency required the use of QRA and OR tools in
route planning, we believe that research in this area would accelerate consid-
erably.
Implementation
It is inconceivable to imagine a hazmat transport DSS that does not take
advantage of a GIS while most academic researchers solve small problems on
made-up (realistic) networks. In fact the ideal hazmat transport DSS would
combine GIS, QRA, OR, and MCDA. We suggest that research in this area
follow the same recipe. This increases adoption probability by the industry. We
note that clever use of GIS can enable one to incorporate nonhuman risks into
the analysis. Another necessary condition for successful implementation of OR
research in this area is cooperation between the researchers, the government
agencies, and the carriers – something we cannot claim has happened with
regularity in the past.
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Recent concern: security
In addition to the concerns discussed above there is a new concern in
hazmat transport planning, namely potential for a terrorist attack on a haz-
mat vehicle. The terrorist attacks in the USA in 2001 have focused atten-
tion on what other targets terrorists may choose. It was quickly recognized
that hazmat vehicles could be desirable targets for terrorists, and certain haz-
mat vehicles were designated as “weapons of mass destruction” (TRB, 2002;
Abkowitz, 2002). Such concerns changed the way the hazmat transport indus-
try operates. For example, the US Federal Government now requires hazmat
truckers to submit to fingerprinting and criminal background checks (Glaze,
2003).
This security issue, however, has not yet received much attention from op-
erations researchers. Clearly, the problem is complex and there are many
solutions that involve little or no OR. However, there is potential for OR con-
tributions and we list three here:
• Rerouting around major cities: the risk of terrorist attacks made it
very undesirable to route hazmat vehicles (particularly trains) through
major population centers. Traditional OR algorithms can be used to
find alternate routes for shipments. Erkut and Glickman (1997) show
that significant risk reductions are possible through rerouting, and
Erkut and Ingolfsson (2000) develop new methodology for routing with
a catastrophe-avoidance objective.
• Changes in the modeling of incidence risks: The traditional risk as-
sessment for hazmat transport assumes incidents are caused by traffic
accidents or human error. Yet we now know that there is a nonzero
probability of a terrorist attack or a hijack. Not only does this increase
the incident probabilities, but it also requires a new way of modeling
consequences since the impact may no longer be limited to the planned
route. Furthermore, attack probabilities are unlikely to be uniform.
For example, a location in a tunnel, on a bridge, or near a “trophy
building” is likely to have a higher attack probability than a location in
a remote and unpopulated area. In contrast, sparsely populated areas
may be associated with a higher hijack probability. A hijacked vehi-
cle’s future route is unpredictable and special precautions may have to
be taken to prevent it from having an incident in a highly populated
area. As a result, traditional risk assessment-based route planning is
no longer adequate. There are very few papers in this new area. (See
Paté-Cornell, 2002, for probabilistic modeling of terrorist threats, and
Huang and Cheu, 2004 and Huang et al., 2003, for incorporation of
security concerns in route planning.)
• Changes in route planning methodology: Past hazmat routing liter-
ature focuses on finding a minimum risk route. The problem with
determining quantitative measures and selecting routes accordingly is
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that terrorists could predict such routes by using similar methods. To
minimize the probability of a successful terrorist attack or hijacking,
shippers could alternate routes – game theory can be applied to the
problem of alternating among routes to minimize predictability – or
change them en-route in real time in ways that would be difficult to
predict. Video surveillance or Global Positioning Systems (GPS) and
communication equipment installed on all hazmat vehicles would not
only allow for precise tracking of vehicles, but also allow the imple-
mentation of such real-time decision making (see, e.g., Glaze, 2003;
Zografos and Androutsopoulos, 2001).
We believe that there are still many important OR problems in hazmat
transportation. However, we think the focus will shift from a priori optimiza-
tion toward real-time adaptive decision making for several reasons, such as the
availability of the necessary technology and data, as well as security concerns.
While it is rather unfortunate that terrorist attacks can and do happen, their
possibility opens up a new frontier for operations researchers in general, and
hazmat transport researchers in particular. We expect that hazmat transport
research will intensify in the near future and we hope that this chapter will be
useful to future researchers in this area.
We finish with an attempt to explain why we find research in hazmat lo-
gistics particularly interesting and challenging, in addition to the potential for
practical applications. The realm of OR can be crudely divided into two major
paradigms: deterministic and stochastic. Optimization is the major tool in the
deterministic area while the stochastic domain requires probabilistic model-
ing. Much of the research in OR can be classified in one of these two regions.
Hazmat logistics research lies in the cross-section of these two domains, and
it requires a good knowledge of probabilistic modeling as well as optimization
techniques. Hazmat transport can be modeled as a probabilistic phenomenon,
but one needs to add optimization of appropriate objectives to realize the pos-
sible policy benefits. The fact that we are modeling an inherently probabilistic
process results in the natural consequence that there are many appropriate ob-
jectives. The exact probabilistic expressions are usually too complicated, which
results in the use of approximations for optimization. Hence, the researchers
must understand probabilistic modeling well enough to capture the essence of
the activity, but they must also be sufficiently proficient in optimization tech-
niques to decide which approximations are necessary and what tools to use.
The multicriteria/multistakeholder nature of the problems adds to the com-
plexity as well as the attraction of this area. We found research in hazmat
logistics quite rewarding and we encourage others to explore this area further.
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